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The U.S. punishment system is in turmoil. We have a historically
unprecedented number of offenders in prison, and our prisoners are
serving longer sentences than in any other country. States are surrepti-
tiously experimenting with formulas for lethal injection cocktails, and
some prisoners are suffering from botched executions. Despite this
tumult, the Eighth Amendment of our Constitution does place limits
on the punishments that may be imposed and how they may be im-
plemented. The difficulty, though, is that the Supreme Court's Eighth
Amendment jurisprudence is a bit of a mess. The Court has been con-
sistent in stating that a focus on offender dignity is at the core of the
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments, but
there has been virtually no analysis of what this dignity requirement
means. This Article takes the first foray into this unexplored landscape
and finds that the Constitution demands that the individuality of of-
fenders be considered in imposing and carrying out sentences. While
this appears to be a simple concept, it raises significant concerns about
several modem-day sentencing practices. Punishments rooted in pure
utilitarianism, by neglecting the importance of the individual offender,
run afoul of this dignity demand. This sheds doubt on the propriety of
some judges' assertions that defendants' freestanding innocence claims
cannot stand because policy considerations like finality are of para-
mount importance; an individual offender cannot be ignored purely
for the sake of societal goals. For the same reason, the importance of
individual dignity should lead us to question statutes supporting only
utilitarian aims of punishment. While this raises questions about the
constitutionality of pure deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapacitation,
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these purposes of punishment may be reconceptualized to account for
the individual offender. For example, rehabilitation could be reformu-
lated to consider not only the offender's effects on society when he is
returned to the community, but also whether the offender's character
has been reformed. Finally, the importance of Eighth Amendment
dignity raises questions about the constitutionality of mandatorily im-
posed punishments, which overlook the importance of individualiza-
tion in sentencing. If we take seriously the dignity core of the Eighth
Amendment, then many of these practices must be reconsidered.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The punishment landscape in the United States is constantly chang-
ing and is currently in a state of turmoil. There is a historically unprece-
dented number of prisoners in U.S. prisons;' prisoners are serving longer
1. See COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION ET AL., THE
GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 2
(2014). The number of people incarcerated in the United States has declined slightly in recent years,





sentences here than anywhere else in the world;2 some jurisdictions are
chemically castrating sex offenders;3 a shortage of lethal injection drugs
has led states to experiment with lethal injection cocktails;' and one state
has decided to carry out executions with firing squads.' All of these ap-
proaches to punishment raise the question of what qualifies as acceptable
punishment in our nation.
The acceptability of punishment is more than a policy decision. The
Constitution's Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause places limitations
on the sentences jurisdictions may impose and the ways in which they
may implement punishments.6 For example, the Supreme Court has held
that, pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, jurisdictions may not execute
juvenile offenders or "insane" persons.' Further, prisons must provide
adequate medical care to their inmates and may not use unnecessary
force against them.8 Despite these fairly clear guidelines, there is a lot of
gray area under the Eighth Amendment. In particular, it is difficult to as-
sess when a punishment is too harsh and when legitimate punishment has
crossed over the line into the area of prohibited torture. As a result of
uncertainty about what punishments are appropriate and the various
twists and tangles of the Court's cases in this area, scholars have de-
scribed the Court's Punishments Clause jurisprudence as simply a mess.9
However, the Court has remained predictable in one sense: its Eighth
Amendment cases consistently invoke the concept of dignity. As a plural-
ity of the Court famously stated in Trop v. Dulles,o "[t]he basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
2. See COMM. ON CAUSES & CONSEQUENCES OF HIGH RATES OF INCARCERATION ET AL., supra
note 1, at 24-25, 34, 52-58 (examining the long prison sentences in U.S. prisons); see also Adam Go-
pnik, The Caging of America: Why Do We Lock Up So Many People?, NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, at
72 (stating that "huge numbers of [American prisoners] are serving sentences much longer than those
given for similar crimes anywhere else in the civilized world.").
3. See Madison Park, Using Chemical Castration to Punish Child Sex Crimes, CNN (Sept. 5,
2012,4:30 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/09/05/health/chemical-castration-science/.
4. See Matt Ford, How to Execute People in the 21st Century, ATLANTIC (Mar. 13, 2015), http://
www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/gas-chambers-electric-chairs-and-firing-squads/387706/.
See generally Deborah W. Denno, Lethal Injection Chaos Post-Baze, 102 GEO. L.J. 1331 (2014)
(detailing jurisdictions' difficulties in obtaining certain lethal injection drugs and the chaos that has
ensued in the wake of the Court's Baze v. Rees decision).
5. See Mark Berman, Utah's Governor Has Not Decided Whether to Sign Firing Squad Bill,
WASH. POST (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2015/03/11/utahs-
governor-has-not-decided-whether-to-sign-firing-squad-billl; NPR Staff, Utah Brings Back Firing
Squad Executions; Witnesses Recall the Last One, NPR (Apr. 5, 2015), http://www.npr.org/2015/
04/05/397672199/utah-brings-back-firing-squad-executions-wtineses-recall-the-last-one.
6. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
7. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401
(1986).
8. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1992); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).
9. See, e.g., John D. Castiglione, Qualitative and Quantitative Proportionality: A Specific Critique
of Retributivism, 71 OHIo ST. L.J. 71, 75 (2010) ("It has become conventional wisdom that Eighth
Amendment proportionality jurisprudence is a mess."); Tom Stacy, Cleaning Up the Eighth Amend-
ment Mess, 14 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 475,476 (2005) ("The Court's jurisprudence under the Eighth
Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause stands in disarray.").
10. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
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man."" The difficulty is that the Court's understanding of Eighth
Amendment dignity has thus far remained unexamined.
This Article traverses this unsettled terrain and explores the bound-
aries of the dignity conception that animates the Court's Eighth Amend-
ment Punishments Clause jurisprudence. It takes an in-depth look at the
Court's cases explicitly invoking the concept of dignity and surveys the
Court's Eighth Amendment cases more broadly for a better understand-
ing of this principle that serves as the backdrop of the Amendment. The
Article finds that Eighth Amendment dignity means the individuality of
an offender must be respected and punishment of an offender cannot be
used simply to achieve some other end, even if it is societally beneficial.
Although this seems like an elementary concept, it has some significant
implications. If this dignity demand is to be taken seriously, then several
modem-day punishment practices are constitutionally questionable.
To provide broader background on the concept of dignity, Part II of
this Article traces the history of the use of dignity in law and politics from
its early meanings related to an individual's status to its more modem
meanings in the wake of the Holocaust.12 After World War II, reliance on
the concept of dignity gained significant traction, and, today, references
to dignity can be found in national constitutions and international treaties
across the globe.
Part III of this Article explains that the Supreme Court has also wo-
ven dignity into its constitutional analyses -especially in the context of
the Eighth Amendment.'" It consistently invokes dignity in assessing the
constitutionality of punishments, and its reliance on dignity in these deci-
sions is on an upward trajectory. Given the importance of this Eighth
Amendment notion of dignity, Part III notes how surprising it is that the
meaning of dignity in this context has remained largely unexplored. 4
Part IV takes an in-depth look at the Court's Eighth Amendment
dignity jurisprudence. It first examines the cases in which the Court has
explicitly invoked Eighth Amendment dignity and finds that dignity re-
fers to the individuality of the offender. This study reveals that the Court
excavates dignity through examining the proportionality and humanness'6
of the punishment. Individuals differ in their assessments of proportional-
ity, so settling on proportionality is a difficult task. Accordingly, the
Court sometimes examines the motivation or purpose behind the pun-
ishment to determine whether it constitutes legitimate proportional pun-
ishment, or whether it is being imposed for revenge or another illegiti-
mate reason. The Court reflects on the humanness of a punishment
11. Id. at 100.
12. See infra Part H.
13. See infra Part III.
14. See infra Part III.
15. See infra Part IV.
16. I generally use the term "humanness" rather than "humanity" throughout this piece to avoid
confusion, as the latter term has several varying definitions.
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because some punishments are so extreme that no one, not even the
worst of offenders, should be subjected to them in this nation. After en-
gaging in this micro-examination of Eighth Amendment dignity, Part IV
employs a macro-examination of the concept. It considers the Court's
analyses across the entire spectrum of Eighth Amendment cases and
finds that the cases similarly focus on these two facets of individualism-
proportionality and humanness-in sentencing. To aid in this analysis,
Part IV divides the Court's Eighth Amendment cases into five classes:
procedural, type-of-offense, class-of-offender, method-of-punishment,
and prison-condition cases." While the Court addresses each of these
classes in a slightly different manner, each of the Court's analyses focus
on the importance of individualization in sentencing. The concept of dig-
nity could certainly be broader, but the core of the Eighth Amendment
dignity demand is that the individual offender must be considered in im-
posing and implementing punishment.
Part V of this Article explains how this individuality core of the
Eighth Amendment can have tremendous consequences for how we view
punishment." Historically, we have bounced back and forth between ret-
ribution-based punishments and utility-based ones. For example, the util-
ity-based goal of rehabilitation motivated most punishment practices dur-
ing about the first half of the twentieth century." This quickly changed,
though, once decision-makers determined that rehabilitation does not
work. Retributive punishment then swooped in and has been dominating
our punishment system since the late 1970s. More recently, however, re-
tributive punishment has fallen into disfavor, and there are movements to
utilitarianize current punishment practices.20 While there may be many
benefits to utility-based punishment, the individuality core of the Eighth
Amendment suggests that purely utilitarian punishment is unconstitu-
tional because it focuses on the benefits to society rather than on the in-
dividual. It thus fails to comport with the individualism requirement of
the Eighth Amendment dignity demand. While punishment may legiti-
mately have utilitarian components, it cannot completely neglect the im-
portance of the individual offender.
Finally, Part VI provides some examples of punishment practices
that become constitutionally questionable under the Eighth Amendment
focus on individualism." First, the implication that purely utilitarian pun-
ishment is unconstitutional lays the groundwork for challenging certain
approaches to actual innocence claims. Some judges have suggested that
freestanding claims of actual innocence are incognizable in certain cir-
cumstances because procedural considerations indicate that the time for
17. See infra Part IV.B.
18. See infra Part V.
19. See infra Part VI.B.
20. See infra Part VI.B.
21. See infra Part V.
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innocence challenges may have passed.2 2 The Eighth Amendment dignity
demand, though, suggests that the individual offender must be considered
whenever punishment is at issue. Thus, ignoring the guilt or innocence of
an offender is certainly problematic. This may seem obvious, but, trou-
blingly, it is often overlooked once enough time and procedural opportu-
nities have passed. A second concern raised by the requirement of ob-
serving Eighth Amendment dignity relates to jurisdictions' statutes
specifying the relevant aims of punishment. Statutes specifying only utili-
tarian aims of punishment are constitutionally suspect, as they neglect the
importance and individuality of the offender in sentencing. They thus ne-
glect the dignity demand required by the Eighth Amendment. This leads
to a related issue raised by the constitutional requirement of dignity.
Some utilitarian purposes of punishment can perhaps be reconceptual-
ized to accommodate the dignity demand. For example, rehabilitation,
which is traditionally viewed as purely utilitarian in nature, could be re-
formulated to account for the individuality of offenders, thus circumvent-
ing the otherwise constitutional landmine of dignity.2 Sentencers could
take into account both the societal effects of the offender's reintegration
into the community and the individual offender's character reform in set-
tling on an appropriate punishment. Finally, the Eighth Amendment dig-
nity demand suggests that mandatorily imposed punishments are prob-
lematic, as they neglect the individual circumstances of the offender.
Each offender is an individual and must be treated as an end in himself
rather than as a means to achieve some other end. Neglecting the consti-
tutional requirement of dignity that lies at the core of the Eighth
Amendment, these modern-day punishment practices are ripe for suc-
cessful constitutional challenges.
This Article takes the important step of delving into the meaning of
the constitutional requirement of dignity under the Eighth Amendment.
This constitutional demand focuses on the importance of individuality in
sentencing and examines individuality through the lenses of proportional-
ity and humanness. Taking this dignity requirement seriously leads us to
some seemingly simple conclusions, but these conclusions have significant
implications for modern-day sentencing practices. We must reassess the
propriety of these practices in light of this new understanding of Eighth
Amendment dignity.
II. THE CONCEPT OF DIGNITY
The concept of dignity has been around since antiquity. In Roman
times, "dignity" often referred to an individual's, institution's, or state's
status.2 4 There was also a thread of dignity relating to a human being's
22. See infra Part VI.A.
23. See infra Part VI.B.
24. See Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights, 19
EUR. J. INT'L L. 655, 656 (2008).
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unique worth apart from his or her status.25 The Stoics tethered dignity to
a man's rationality.26 This understanding of dignity grew with time, and
this understanding of a human being's specialness was often tied to hu-
mans being created in the image of God."
Despite these ancient roots of dignity, most scholars agree that
modem conceptions of dignity can be traced back to the eighteenth cen-
tury when Immanuel Kant expounded on the idea. While not the first
scholar to discuss the concept, Kant is considered by many to be the fa-
ther of modem understandings of dignity.28 Kant suggested that dignity is
intrinsic in all rational human beings:29
Every human being has a legitimate claim to respect from his fellow
human beings and is in turn bound to respect every other. Humanity
itself is a dignity; for a human being cannot be used merely as a
means by any human being ... but must also be used at the same
time as an end. It is just in this that his dignity ... consists, by which
he raises himself above all other beings in the world that are not
human beings and yet can be used, and so over all things. 0
This non-instrumentalization principle-that individuals should not be
used merely as means to achieve other ends-is a central theme of Kant's
conception of dignity."1 Adoption of this principle constituted a shift away
from dignity's religious roots and anchored dignity to man's rationality
rather than his creation in the image of God.3 2
Although dignity has long been a matter of philosophical discussion,
reliance on dignity in law, philosophy, and politics has become increasing-
25. See id. at 657.
26. See CHARLES FOSTER, HUMAN DIGNITY IN BIOETHICS AND LAW 27 (2011).
27. See id. at 28-31; McCrudden, supra note 24, at 657-59.
28. Giovanni Bognetti, The Concept of Human Dignity in European and U.S. Constitutionalism,
in 37 SCIENCE AND TECHNIQUE OF DEMOCRACY: EUROPEAN AND U.S. CONSTITUTIONALISM 75, 79
(Georg Nolte ed., 2005) ("[T]he father of the modern concept of human dignity is considered to be
Kant .... ); see also Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Drugs, Dignity, and Danger: Human Dignity as a
Constitutional Constraint to Limit Overcriminalization, 80 TENN. L. REV. 291, 309 (2013) ("Kant is con-
sidered by many scholars to be the founder of the modern concept of human dignity.").
29. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 209 (Mary J. Gregor trans. & ed.,
Cambridge University Press 1996) (1797). It has been suggested that Kant's view of dignity is essential-
ly the Stoic view. See FOSTER, supra note 26, at 37.
30. KANT, supra note 29, at 209 (emphasis omitted)
31. See IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 45,46-47 (Allen W.
Wood, ed., 2002) ("Now I say that the human being, and in general every rational being, exists as end in
itself, not merely as means to the discretionary use of this or that will .... The practical imperative will
thus be the following: Act so that you use humanity, as much in your own person as in the person ofeve-
ry other, always at the same time as end and never merely as means."); see also MICHAEL ROSEN,
DIGNITY: ITS HISTORY AND MEANING 24 (2012) (noting that Kant has much to say about human digni-
ty); Meghan J. Ryan, Death and Rehabilitation, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1231, 1271-72 (2013) (citing
scholarship by Luis Roberto Barroso, John D. Castiglione, Izhak Englard, Rex D. Glensy, Maxine D.
Goodman, Oscar Schachter, and, of course, Immanuel Kant). It is also important to recognize that
Kant tied dignity to individual autonomy. See KANT, supra, at 54 ("Autonomy is thus the ground of the
dignity of the human and of every rational nature.").
32. See McCrudden, supra note 24, at 659. One concern with adopting this Kantian view whole-
sale is that some children, intellectually disabled persons, and mentally ill individuals might be consid-
ered not rational and thus not possessing human dignity. Today, most people would likely disagree
with excluding these individuals in this way.
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ly popular in the wake of World War II.33 As a reaction to atrocities per-
petrated by the Nazis, a number of nations have recognized the im-
portance of working to safeguard individuals' rights and dignities, and to
prevent another Holocaust from taking place.H This led to the creation of
the United Nations35 and its adoption of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights ("UDHR") in 1948, which is premised on "recog-
ni[zing] ... the inherent dignity ... of all members of the human fami-
ly." 6 Also rising from the ashes of defeat in World War II, West Germa-
ny, Japan, and Italy all incorporated the concept of dignity into their
respective constitutions." Israel's Declaration of Independence in 1948
similarly espoused the Israelis' "right to a life of dignity."38 And several
other nations have also incorporated the concept of dignity into their na-
tional constitutions. For example, India's Constitution provides that the
nation "resolve[s] .. . to secure to all its citizens ... fraternity assuring the
dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation."39 Simi-
larly, South Africa's Constitution states that "[e]veryone has inherent
dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.""
The concept of dignity is also pervasive in international legal docu-
ments. For example, the Geneva Conventions each provide that "outrag-
es upon personal dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treat-
33. See id. at 662-64.
34. See UNITED NATIONS, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: HISTORY OF THE
DOCUMENT, http://www.un.org/en/sections/universal-declaration/history-document/ (last visited Sept.
9,2016).
35. The Preamble to the United Nations Charter provides that "the peoples of the United Na-
tions [are] determined ... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small." U.N. Charter
Pmbl.
36. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III)
(Dec. 10, 1948). "Dignity" is referenced five times in the Declaration. See id. Although the drafters
came to the table with unique understandings of dignity based upon their religious and philosophical
differences, they agreed on the basic principle that man should not be used merely as a means to
achieve some other end; instead, man is an end in himself. See Martha Nussbaum, Human Dignity and
Political Entitlements, in HUMAN DIGNITY AND BIOETHICS: ESSAYS COMMISSIONED BY THE
PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON BIOETHIcS 360 (2008) (suggesting that the drafters "could agree on the idea
that the human being is an end and not merely a means, and their account of human rights embodied a
practical political agreement deriving from this shared intuitive idea, which different religions would
then interpret further in different ways.") (citing JACQUES MARITAIN, MAN AND THE STATE (1951)).
37. See McCrudden, supra note 24, at 664-65; see also GRUNDGESETz FOR DIE BUDESREPUBLIK
DEUTSCHLAND [CONSTITUTION] May 23, 1949, art. 1 (Ger.) ("Human dignity shall be inviolable. To
respect and protect it shall be the duty of all state authority."); COSTITUzIONE DELLA REPUBBLICA
ITALIANA [CONSTITUTION] Dec. 27, 1947, arts. 3 & tit. I, art. 27 (It.) (providing that "[a]ll citizens have
equal social dignity and are equal before the law," and that "[plunishment cannot consist in treatment
contrary to human dignity and must aim at rehabilitating the condemned"); NIHON KOKU KENPO
[CONSTITUTION] May 3, 1947, ch. 3, art. 24 (1946) (Japan) ("With regard to choice of spouse, property
rights, inheritance, choice of domicile, divorce and other matters pertaining to marriage and the family,
laws shall be enacted from the standpoint of individual dignity and the essential equality of the sex-
es.").
38. THE DECLARATION OF THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE STATE OF ISRAEL (1948); see also gener-
ally Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992, SH no. 1391 (Isr.) (providing legal protection for
human dignity).
39. INDIA CONST. Pmbl.
40. THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA May 8, 1996.
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ment," shall not be employed against "[p]ersons taking no active part in
hostilities."4 ' Similarly, the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedi-
cine states that "[p]arties to th[e] Convention shall protect the dignity and
identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimina-
tion, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental free-
doms with regard to the application of biology and medicine."4 2
Dignity is also important in U.S. domestic law. The U.S. Supreme
Court Justices referred to the concept of dignity as early as 1793,'4 and the
Court and its Justices continue to employ the concept today." Early on,
references to dignity focused on dignity as an institutional status, but,
consistent with the rest of the world, the Court's focus on dignity shifted
to highlight individual dignity following World War II.45 The concept of
dignity is sprinkled throughout the Supreme Court's constitutional deci-
sions, and the Court's use of the term "dignity" has steadily increased
throughout the years. 46 The Court has employed the concept in a wide ar-
ray of constitutional matters, ranging from First Amendment rights, to
search and seizure law, to equal protection analysis. 47 Justice William J.
Brennan, Jr. has even argued that human dignity is the animating princi-
ple behind the entire Constitution.4
41. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 973; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12,
1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 972; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick
and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 971; Geneva Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field,
Aug. 12, 1949,75 U.N.T.S. 970.
42. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the Human Being with regard
to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine , Apr. 4,
1997, C.E.T.S. No. 164.
43. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471 (1793) (Jay, C.J.) (explaining that "the people ...
declared with becoming dignity, 'We the people of the United States, do ordain and establish this Con-
stitution.'"); id. at 451 (Blair, J.) (referring to the "dignity of a state"); id. at 455 (Wilson, J.) ("Man,
fearfully and wonderfully made, is the workmanship of his all perfect Creator: A State; useful and val-
uable as the contrivance is, is the inferior contrivance of man; and from his native dignity derives all its
acquired importance.").
44. See infra Part lI.A.
45. See Leslie Meltzer Henry, The Jurisprudence of Dignity, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 169, 203 (2011).
46. See id. at 179-80 & Fig. 3. Professor Henry has explained that the Court's use of the term in
majority opinions has increased "at a statistically significant rate (two-tailed p-value = 0.004)." Id. at
180. She noted that "[t]here is a statistically significant, positive relationship between Court Term and
the percentage of majority opinions that use dignity (r = 0.35, p = 0.004)." Id. at 180 n.48.
47. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2692 (2013) ("This status is a far-reaching
legal acknowledgment of the intimate relationship between two people, a relationship deemed by the
State worthy of dignity in the community equal with all other marriages."); Hudson v. Michigan, 547
U.S. 586, 594 (2006) (stating in its Fourth Amendment analysis that "the knock-and-announce rule pro-
tects those elements of privacy and dignity that can be destroyed by a sudden entrance."); Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) ("The constitutional right of free expression ... is designed and in-
tended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion . .. in the belief that no
other approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which our polit-
ical system rests.").
48. See William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States: Contemporary Ratification,
27 S. TEx. L. REV. 433, 438-45 (1986) (stating that "the Constitution is a sublime oration on the dignity
of man" and that "[t]he vision of human dignity [is] embodied within the Constitution"; that the docu-
ment's "text [as augmented by the Bill of Rights and the Civil War amendments] is a sparkling vision of
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Having been relied on in a variety of settings and by an array of na-
tions, as well as in international law, the concept of dignity has been de-
scribed in a number of different ways. Scholars have described dignity as
"a basic value accepted in a broad sense by all peoples"4 9 and as "perhaps
the premier value underlying the last two centuries of moral and political
thought."' As used today, the concept of dignity is pervasive and multi-
faceted. There are many different conceptions of dignity, ranging from
the heightened status of certain individuals or entities, to the autonomy
of individuals, to acting in accordance with societal expectations. For ex-
ample, Professor Louis Henkin has explained that "human dignity re-
quires that in any society every person count, that he (she) be considered
worthy as an individual, not merely as part of the collectivity."" His un-
derstanding of dignity obligates us to respect an individual's "autonomy
and freedom," "physical and psychic integrity," and "'personhood' before
the law."S2 Moreover, these elements of dignity should not "be lightly sac-
rificed, even for the welfare of the majority or for the common good.""
Professor Leon Kass has articulated a conception of dignity that focuses
not just on personhood, but also on the importance of human life.- He
has suggested that "respect for a being created in God's image means re-
specting everything about him, not just his freedom or his reason but also
his blood."" Thus, Kass explained, dignity requires something more than
respecting autonomy, and individual autonomy may even be sacrificed to
protect human life, such as in prohibiting euthanasia.5 6 He has developed
"an ethical account of human flourishing based on a biological account of
human life as lived, not just physically, but psychically, socially and spirit-
ually." 7 Professor Nick Bostrom has considered "[d]ignity as moral sta-
tus" as "the inalienable right to be treated with a basic level of respect.""
He has viewed the level of dignity that each individual possesses-the
the supremacy of the human dignity of every individual"; and that the document is designed to secure
"the freedom, the dignity, and the rights of all persons within our borders."); Ryan, supra note 31, at
1271 n.246 (noting that Justice Brennan suggested "that the concept of human dignity is the animating
principle behind the entire Constitution.").
49. Oscar Schachter, Editorial Comment: Human Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J.
INT'L L. 848, 848 (1983).
50. Hugo Adam Bedau, The Eighth Amendment, Human Dignity, and the Death Penalty, in THE
CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS: HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 145, 145 (Michael J. Meyer &
William A. Parent eds., 1992).
51. Louis Henkin, Human Dignity and Constitutional Rights, in THE CONSTITUTION OF RIGHTS:
HUMAN DIGNITY AND AMERICAN VALUES 210, 210 (Michael J. Meyer & William A. Parent eds.,
1992).
52. Id. Henkin stated that, "[s]ometimes[,] human dignity is seen as requiring more-the full de-
velopment of the individual's personality, respect by society and by one's neighbors, security for one's
'honor' and self-esteem." Id. at 211.
53. Id. at 211.
54. See LEON R. KASS, LIFE, LIBERTY AND THE DEFENSE OF DIGNITY: THE CHALLENGE OF
BIOETHICS 17-18 (2002).
55. Id. at 21.
56. See id. at 17-18, 240-56.
57. Id. at 21.
58. Nick Bostrom, In Defense of Posthuman Dignity, 19 BIOETHICS 202,209 (2005).
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"moral worthiness" of an individual-as changeable, though, based upon
the individual's particular characteristics. 9 Professor Martha Nussbaum
has expressed a broader understanding of dignity. She has adopted the
non-instrumentalization aspect of Kant's dignity conception,6 but addi-
tionally has found that ten individual capabilities must be observed in ac-
cordance with properly respecting human dignity: (1) life; (2) bodily
health; (3) bodily integrity; (4) senses, imagination, and thought; (5) emo-
tions; (6) practical reason; (7) affiliation; (8) relationships with other spe-
cies; (9) play; (10) and control over one's environment (both political and
material).' Even more broadly, Professor Erin Daly has argued that the
rights surrounding dignity "include interests associated with equality, ex-
pression, due process, privacy, health, family, work, and virtually every
other sphere of life." 62
Perhaps frustratingly, there seems to be no clear consensus on the
exact meaning of dignity across disciplines, or even within disciplines."
This has led some scholars to label dignity as "a useless concept."M Pro-
fessor Ruth Macklin, for example, has argued that "dignity" is meaning-
less-"that appeals to dignity are either vague restatements of other,
more precise, notions or mere slogans that add nothing to an understand-
ing of the topic." 65 Similarly, responding to the lack of consensus on the
meaning of dignity, Professor Steven Pinker has said that "the concept of
dignity remains a mess" -"a phenomenon of human perception."" And
Professor Helga Kuhse has asserted that the concept is "nothing more
than a short-hand expression for people's moral intuitions and feelings."6
Despite the widely varying conceptions of dignity, there seems to be
a core understanding of dignity to which most courts, constitution and
treaty drafters, and scholars subscribe. Professor Christopher McCrudden
59. Id. at 209-10. Bostrom distinguished between this type of dignity, and the "human dignity"
that refers to "[d]ignity as moral status." Id. at 209.
60. See Nussbaum, supra note 36, at 353 ("Indeed, one good general way of thinking about the
intuitive idea of dignity is that it is the idea of being an end rather than merely a means.").
61. See id. at 351, 377-78.
62. ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE WORTH OF THE HUMAN
PERSON 5-6 (2013).
63. See FOSTER, supra note 26, at 43-57 (laying out several different conceptions of dignity in the
context of bioethics). For a useful discussion of human dignity, see generally UNDERSTANDING
HUMAN DIGNITY (Christopher McCrudden ed., 2013) (discussing the history of the concept,
current debates on the topic, and various conceptions of human dignity).
64. Ruth Macklin, Dignity is a Useless Concept, 327 BRITISH MED. J. 1419,1419 (2003).
65. Id. Macklin has suggested that, in the bioethics context, "dignity seems to be nothing other
than respect for autonomy." Id. It is "a useless concept" -at least in the context of "medical ethics." Id.
Professor John Witte, Jr. has said that "the concept of human dignity has become ubiquitous to the
point of clich6-a moral trump frayed by heavy use, a general principle harried by constant invoca-
tion." John Witte, Jr., Between Sanctity and Depravity: Human Dignity in Protestant Perspective, in IN
DEFENSE OF HUMAN DIGNITY: ESSAYS FOR OUR TIMEs 119, 121 (Robert P. Kraynak & Glenn Tinder
eds., 2003).
66. Steven Pinker, The Stupidity of Dignity, NEW REPUBLIC (May 28, 2008), https://new
republic.com/article/64674/the-stupidity-dignity.
67. Helga Kuhse, Is There a Tension Between Autonomy and Dignity?, in 2 BIOETHICS AND
BIOLAW 61, 72 (Peter Kemp et al. eds., 2000).
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has explained that this "minimum core" of human dignity includes three
principles:6 First, there is general agreement that "every human being
possesses an intrinsic worth."'6 Second, others should recognize and re-
spect this intrinsic worth. 0 And finally, recognizmig every individual's in-
trinsic worth "requires that the state should be seen to exist for the sake
of the individual human being, and not vice versa."" This last core ele-
ment of dignity-that the state exists for the individual-is akin to Kant's
command that an individual is an end in himself and not a means to
achieve some other end.2 And it is the same core concept on which the
drafters of the UDHR agreed after World War II.7 This core principle of
the non-instrumentalization of human beings thus seems to be well ac-
cepted.
III. EIGHTH AMENDMENT DIGNITY
The U.S. Supreme Court has increasingly relied on dignity in its
constitutional decision-making. One of the primary areas in which the
Supreme Court regularly relies on dignity is in the Eighth Amendment
context of cruel and unusual punishments. The Court has said that dignity
is the touchstone of the Amendment's prohibition, yet the Court has not
clearly defined the concept, and few scholars have delved into the cases
to determine what Eighth Amendment dignity really means. To the ex-
tent that scholars have examined the Court's Eighth Amendment dignity
jurisprudence, they have done so in the context of larger projects, thus
not giving this breed of dignity the attention that it really deserves.
68. McCrudden, supra note 24, at 679. Henry has argued that "McCrudden's 'minimum core'
suffers from [drawing the concept of dignity too broadly]." See Henry, supra note 46, at 185-86. She
stated that, under his view, dignity "could conceivably encompass all of the cases," or almost all of the
cases, that she set out. See id. Of course that is what I interpret McCrudden as trying to do in defining
this "minimum core" of dignity.
69. McCrudden, supra note 24, at 679. McCrudden referred to this as the "ontological" claim. Id.
He suggested that everyone possesses this intrinsic worth "merely by being human," but there is some
disagreement as to why human beings possess dignity and also whether human beings are the only
creatures that possess such dignity. Kant would perhaps object to this first point, because he tied digni-
ty to an individual's rationality. See KANT, supra note 31, at 54 (suggesting that that only rational be-
ings possess dignity); Ryan, supra note 31, at 1271-72 (noting that "Kant[] determin[ed] that dignity is
intrinsic in all rational human beings."); R. George Wright, The Progressive Logic of Criminal Respon-
sibility and the Circumstances of the Most Deprived, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 459, 461 (1994) ("Immanuel
Kant is well known for his linkage of the capacity for rational decisionmaking and dignity or moral val-
ue.").
70. See McCrudden, supra note 24, at 679. McCrudden refered to this claim as the "relational"
claim. Id.
71. Id. McCrudden refered to this claim as the "limited-state claim." Id.
72. Compare id. (explaining the "limited-state claim" of the dignity core), with KANT, supra note
29, at 209; cf supra text accompanying notes 29-31 (summarizing Kant's understanding of dignity).
73. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
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A. Backdrop of the Eighth Amendment
Since 1958, the Supreme Court has emphasized that the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments is focused
on preserving the dignity of man. In that year, the Court decided Trop v.
Dulles74 -a case in which the Court confronted the constitutionality of
denationalization as a punishment for wartime desertion." In the case,
the Court sought to excavate the meaning of the prohibition:
The exact scope of the constitutional phrase "cruel and unusual" has
not been detailed by this Court, but the basic policy reflected in
these words is firmly established in the Anglo-American tradition of
criminal justice. The phrase in our Constitution was taken directly
from the English Declaration of Rights of 1688, and the principle it
represents can be traced back to the Magna Carta. The basic con-
cept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dig-
nity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amend-
ment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits
of civilized standards.7 6
There is no indication that the explicit focus on human dignity was drawn
from the historical pedigree of the prohibition on cruel and unusual pun-
ishmentsn and the Court, in subsequent cases, has not expanded much on
the scope of this Eighth Amendment dignity principle. Instead, the Court
generally bases its Eighth Amendment decisions on both the popularity
of the punishment among the states and the Court's own "independent
judgment" about the propriety of the punishment practice.78 The Court's
reference to dignity, though, seems to be more than just a rhetorical
flourish. It is dignity, not these other two areas of examination, that the
Court has said is at the heart of the Eighth Amendment.
Despite the uncertainty of the source of this dignity principle as it
relates to cruel and unusual punishments, the Court has remained con-
74. 356 U.S. 86 (1958) (plurality opinion).
75. See id. at 87.
76. Id. at 99-100.
77. See id.; see also Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Prohibit
Only Punishments that Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 567,573-80 (2010) (examin-
ing the historical roots of the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments). Eighth Amendment dig-
nity, then, does not seem to be rooted in the text or the history of the Eighth Amendment prohibition.
However, some principles that are bound up in the concept of Eighth Amendment dignity may be
rooted in the history of the prohibition. See, e.g., John F. Stinneford, Rethinking Proportionality Under
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 97 VA. L. REv. 899, 959-61 (2011) ("The Supreme Court's
decision to engage in proportionality review under the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause is well-
founded as a textual and historical matter.").
78. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564-75 (2005) (examining the "national consensus
against the death penalty for juveniles" and applying the Court's own "independent judgment" to the
question of the punishment's constitutionality); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311-21 (2002) (as-
sessing the popularity of the punishment and applying the Court's own independent judgment in as-
sessing whether the punishment was unconstitutionally cruel and unusual); see also Ryan, supra note
77, at 586-91 (summarizing the Court's general approach to examining Eighth Amendment questions).
The dignity analysis may be rolled into the Court's application of its own judgment.
No. 5]1 2141
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
sistent in invoking the concept." For example, in its 2002 case of Atkins v.
Virginia," the Court quoted Trop, repeating that "'[t]he basic concept
underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the dignity of
man."'8 ' Again in its 2002 Hope v. PelzerP opinion the Court quoted this
same language." In 2005, the Court stated that, "[b]y protecting even
those convicted of heinous crimes, the Eighth Amendment reaffirms the
duty of the government to respect the dignity of all persons.", In 2008,
the Court explained that the "[e]volving standards of decency must em-
brace and express respect for the dignity of the person, and the punish-
ment of criminals must conform to that rule."" In 2011, the Court stated
that "[r]espect for [human] dignity animates the Eighth Amendment pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment."8 And in one of the
Court's most recent Eighth Amendment opinions-Hall v. Florida"-it
emphasized the importance of dignity, referencing the government's duty
"to respect the dignity of all persons" and "the Eighth Amendment's pro-
tection of human dignity."" Overall, the Court has remained quite con-
sistent in tying the Eighth Amendment to this concept of dignity.
B. Little Scholarly Attention
Despite this importance of dignity in the Eighth Amendment con-
text, very little attention has been paid to what Eighth Amendment "dig-
nity" really means. The few scholars who have looked into this have ei-
ther determined with little analysis that it is a Kantian conception of
dignity or, with a bit more analysis, that it is really the dignity of society-
not of individual human beings -that is at issue here.
Considering that many scholars view Kant as the father of the mod-
ern concept of dignity," it is not surprising that most scholars looking at
the meaning of dignity under the Constitution have relied on Kant for
79. It is worth noting that Justices Kennedy and Stevens are responsible for most of these Eighth
Amendment opinions relying on the concept of dignity. See Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014);
Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011); Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); Roper, 543 U.S. 551;
Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730 (2002); Atkins, 536 U.S. 304; Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988)
(plurality opinion). In each of these opinions, though, a majority of the Court signed on to the dignity
language.
80. 536 U.S. 304.
81. Id. at 311-12 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
82. 536 U.S. 730.
83. See id. at 738 (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 100).
84. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
85. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,420 (2008).
86. Brown, 563 U.S. at 510.
87. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
88. Id. at 1992 (quoting Roper, 543 U.S. at 560); see also id. at 1999 ("If the States were to have
complete autonomy to define intellectual disability as they wished, the Court' decision in Atkins
could become a nullity, and the Eighth Amendment's protection of human dignity would not be-
come a reality.").
89. See supra text accompanying note 27.
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their understandings of the concept.' For example, one scholar has as-
serted that "it is the Kantian vision of dignity that seemingly animates"
the Court's interpretation of constitutional provisions such as the Pun-
ishments Clause.91 In support of this, he pointed to the Court's opinion in
Hope, which focused on the degrading and humiliating nature of punish-
ing an inmate by hitching him to a post for an extended period of time in
intense heat without water or restroom privileges.9 The scholar then con-
cluded that the Court's reasoning in this case supports the view that
"people must not be treated as objects." 3 Another scholar has broadly
described the Court's understanding of dignity as relying on Kant's for-
mulation and then has examined the Court's adherence to, and departure
from, this dignity standard through employing this particular conception
of dignity.? Scholars such as these, who point to a Kantian view of digni-
ty, including Eighth Amendment dignity, seem to have shied away from
looking at the relevant Eighth Amendment cases in much depth. Eighth
Amendment dignity is important, though, and it deserves more concen-
trated attention.
Other scholars have looked at dignity in a bit more depth and sug-
gested that Eighth Amendment dignity is concerned about society rather
than the individual. For example, Professor Leslie Meltzer Henry has ar-
gued that the Eighth Amendment focuses on "collective virtue as digni-
ty" -that the Court's jurisprudence in this area concentrates on creating
a society that is decent.? In buttressing this conclusion, Henry pointed to
the Court's language in five select Eighth Amendment opinions: Ford v.
Wainwright," Atkins v. Virginia,' Hope v. Pelzer," Roper v. Simmons,'
and Brown v. Plata.0 Like Henry, Professor Michal Buchhandler-
Raphael has concluded that Eighth Amendment dignity reflects "com-
90. See Rex D. Glensy, The Right to Dignity, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REv. 65,86 (2011) (stating
that "it is the Kantian vision of dignity that seemingly animates [the Supreme Court Justices]" when
they discuss the concept of dignity in constitutional cases); see also Luis Roberto Barroso, Here, There,
and Everywhere: Human Dignity in Contemporary Law and in the Transnational Discourse, 35 B.C.
INT'L & CoMP. L. REv. 331, 358 (2012) ("Many of [Kant's] reflections are directly connected with the
idea of human dignity, and it is not surprising that he is one of the most frequently cited authors in
works on the subject."); Maxine D. Goodman, Human Dignity in Supreme Court Constitutional Juris-
prudence, 84 NEB. L. REV. 740, 748 (2006) ("Immanuel Kant is generally thought responsible for our
understanding of human dignity." (citing Bedau, supra note 50, at 152)); cf. Glensy, supra, at 75-76
(stating "Immanuel Kant [is] regarded as the father of the modem concept of dignity," but noting that
"[wlhile Kant was certainly fundamental to the shaping of European legal precepts and modem inter-
national law, it is arguable that [Kant's] influence on the United States was less potent.").
91. Glensy, supra note 90, at 86.
92. See id. at 88; Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 734-35 (2002); infra text accompanying notes 156-
59.
93. Glensy, supra note 90, at 88.
94. See Goodman, supra note 90, at 748-53, 757, 772-78 (2006) (tying the Court's conception of
dignity-including in the Eighth Amendment context-to Kant's conception).
95. Henry, supra note 45, at 222-24.
96. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
97. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
98. 536 U.S. 730 (2002
99. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
100. 563 U.S. 493 (2011); see Henry, supra note 54, at 225.
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munitarian virtue," meaning that this conception of dignity focuses on so-
ciety-on what society has deemed "civilized, decent, and virtuous.""o
Pointing to some of the same cases, she too placed less importance on the
individual offender in the Eighth Amendment context. Both Henry and
Buchhandler-Raphael addressed Eighth Amendment dignity in the con-
text of larger projects dealing with constitutional dignity more broadly,
though. As a result, their examinations of Eighth Amendment dignity are
not as nuanced as they could be. Eighth Amendment dignity-and the
unique ways in which the Court addresses it-deserves greater attention.
IV. PUNISHMENTS CLAUSE CASES, DIGNITY, AND THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE INDIVIDUAL
Examining the meaning of dignity under the Eighth Amendment re-
ally requires an in-depth exploration of the case law in this area. The
Court began putting dignity to use in its landmark Eighth Amendment
case of Trop v. Dulles." Since then, the Court has continued to cite the
concept of dignity in its Punishments Clause cases. Like the core of most
definitions of dignity in other areas, the Court's explicit use of dignity in
these cases highlights the importance of viewing individuals as ends ra-
ther than merely as means. In doing this, the Court emphasizes the im-
portance of the offender as an individual human being. In some ways, this
is akin to the Kantian approach to dignity. This concept of individualism
is not only suggested by the Court's clear invocation of dignity, but also
the general thrust of the Court's cases under the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments is that we must respect the
importance of individuals in this regard.
A. The Court's Invocation of Dignity in Eighth Amendment Cases
In a handful of its Eighth Amendment cases, the Court has provided
more detail on what it means when it refers to dignity in relation to the
constitutional prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. This con-
ception of dignity is focused on human beings as individuals. One facet of
this concentration on the individual is that the offender should not re-
ceive greater punishment than he deserves. Punishment for some other
reason-such as to further society in some way-loses sight of the indi-
vidual. The other facet of the focus on the individual is emphasizing the
fact that the individual is a human being. There are some punishments
that are so inhumane, so uncivilized, that no one should be punished in
that manner-not even humans who have committed the vilest of offens-
es.
101. Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 28, at 317.




The first facet of the Court's focus on individualism in discussing
Eighth Amendment dignity is proportionality, which relates to agreement
between the offender's desert resulting from his culpability and the hei-
nousness of his offense, and the punishment imposed.'03 Such proportion-
ality is sometimes difficult to determine, however. While people often
have a rough sense of which criminal offense is more or less heinous than
another offense, people often disagree about exactly what punishment is
proportionate to a particular offense.10 4 Because of this indeterminacy,
the Court has found another question relevant in determining propor-
tionality -whether the punishment has been imposed for some reason
other than a traditional purpose of punishment.o' If punishment is im-
103. This proportionality is most often thought of in terms of retribution. See Richard S. Frase,
Excessive Prison Sentences, Punishment Goals, and the Eighth Amendment: "Proportionality" Relative
to What?, 89 MINN. L. REv. 571, 575 (2005) ("Anglo-American courts and scholars have usually (but as
will be shown, not universally) applied the concept of proportionality only when discussing retributive
sentencing principles."). Although the Court in Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976), appeared to
adopt a harm-based approach to retribution-one that measures desert based only on an offender's
culpable state of mind and the harms the offender caused by his crime-many scholars prefer an intent-
based approach to retribution that measures desert based only on the offender's culpable state of mind.
See Meghan J. Ryan, Proximate Retribution, 48 Hous. L. REV. 1049, 1063 (2012). Beyond retribution,
Professor Richard Frase has outlined other conceptions of proportionality, such as ends- and means-
proportionality. See Frase, supra, at 592-97. But see Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 31 (2003) (Scalia,
J., concurring) ("Proportionality-the notion that the punishment should fit the crime-is inherently a
concept tied to the penological goal of retribution. 'It becomes difficult even to speak intelligently of
proportionality, once deterrence and rehabilitation are given significant weight."' (internal quotations
and citations omitted)); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 989 (1991) (Scalia, J.) ("[I]t becomes diffi-
cult even to speak intelligently of 'proportionality,' once deterrence and rehabilitation are given signifi-
cant weight. Proportionality is inherently a retributive concept, and perfect proportionality is the tali-
onic law.").
104. See Meghan J. Ryan, Finality and Rehabilitation, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 121, 140
(2014); Ryan, supra note 103, at 1064.
105. See, e.g., Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992) (finding that the use of excessive force
amounts to an Eighth Amendment violation even when the inmate does not suffer a serious injury be-
cause, "[w]hen prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to cause harm, contemporary
standards of decency always are violated").
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posed for some other reason, such as for vengeance or as a result of the
sadistic desires of a prison guard, it is unjustified and unconstitutional.1tt
The second facet of the Court's focus on individualism is human-
ness-recognizing that the offender is a human being and that certain
punishments, like torture, are therefore prohibited no matter what crime
the offender committed. Such punishments are simply too horrendous to
impose on any offender. The Court first forayed into this area of per se
unconstitutional punishments when it initially invoked the concept of
dignity under the Eighth Amendment in Trop.'t 0 There, the Court ex-
amined whether the punishment of denationalization violated the Eighth
Amendment." The question arose when a defendant was so punished for
his conviction of wartime desertion, but the controlling plurality of the
Court did not seem to limit its analysis to this particular context. Instead,
it broadly stated that it was determining "whether denationalization is a
cruel and unusual punishment."10 Addressing the first facet of individual-
ism, the plurality explained that the punishment could not be found dis-
proportionate to the offense of conviction, because death-perhaps the
most extreme punishment under American law-was another authorized
punishment for the crime.110 Turning to the humanness facet, the plurality
framed the question as one of "whether th[e] penalty subjects the indi-
vidual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaran-
teed by the Eighth Amendment.""' The plurality said that denationaliza-
tion was even "more primitive than torture."112 It destroys a part of the
individual, "strip[ping] him of his status in the national and international
political community" and of his "right to have rights."113 The plurality
concluded that no one should be subject to such a punishment. 114 In
reaching this conclusion, the plurality demonstrated that this concern for
the individual is at the heart of the Court's understanding of dignity: "The
basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing less than the
dignity of man. While the State has the power to punish, the Amendment
stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized
standards.""'
106. See id. ("[W]e hold that whenever prison officials stand accused of using excessive physical
force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, the core judicial inquiry is ... whether
force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore discipline, or maliciously and sadistically
to cause harm."); infra text accompanying notes 122-23, 263-65.
107. 356 U.S. at 99.
108. See id. at 87.
109. Id. at 99.
110. See id ("Since wartime desertion is punishable by death, there can be no argument that the
penalty of denationalization is excessive in relation to the gravity of the crime. The question is whether
this penalty subjects the individual to a fate forbidden by the principle of civilized treatment guaran-
teed by the Eighth Amendment.").
111. Id.
112. Id. at 101.
113. Id. at 101-02.
114. Id. at 104 (concluding that the punishment of denationalization is unconstitutional).
115. Id. at 100.
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Having expounded primarily on the humanness facet of dignity in
Trop, the Justices elaborated on the proportionality aspect of Eighth
Amendment dignity in the famous 1976 case of Gregg v. Georgia"6 -in
which the Court approved a state capital sentencing scheme after it had
previously struck down as unconstitutional capital punishment as it had
earlier been practiced by the states." 7 There, a plurality of the Court sug-
gested that the concept of dignity means, at a minimum, that the punish-
ment must not be "excessive.""' Measuring excessiveness, the plurality
explained, means looking first at whether "the punishment... involve[s]
the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain," and, second, at whether
"the punishment [is] grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime.""' While perfect proportionality would be desirable, the plurality
acknowledged that proportionality is a matter of judgment and that state
legislatures and juries may disagree with individual Justices as to what the
perfect level of proportionality might be in any given case.120 Accordingly,
the plurality conceded that it could not strike down a punishment as fail-
ing to comport with the dignity requirement just because a majority of
the Court disagreed with the severity of the punishment necessary to
achieve penological ends.121 Thus, review was for only gross dispropor-
tionality.12 The plurality, however, explained that "the sanction imposed
cannot be so totally without penological justification that it results in the
gratuitous infliction of suffering."' If the Court finds that the punish-
ment is imposed for some reason other than an acceptable purpose of
punishment-that it is "unnecessar[ily]" imposed or constitutes the "wan-
ton" infliction of pain-then the punishment will run afoul of the Eighth
Amendment.1 24 Ultimately, the Gregg Court found that Georgia's capital
sentencing scheme provided sufficient guidance to sentencers such
that they could adequately take into account the offender's crime and
116. 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion).
117. See id. at 206-07.
118. Id. at 173.
119. Id.
120. See id. at 174-75.
121. See id. at 183-84.
122. See id. at 173. In more recent years, the Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence in capital
cases has migrated from examining gross disproportionality to just disproproportionality. Compare,
e.g., id. (stating that a "punishment must not be grossly out of proportion to the severity of the
crime."), with Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 446 (2008) (concluding that "the death penalty is
not a proportional punishment for the rape of a child" and is therefore unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) (concluding that "the death penalty
is disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18" and is thus unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment). The Court has also recently extended this more easily met disproportionality standard
beyond the capital context. See, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718, 732-33 (2016) (stating in
a non-capital case that "[p]rotection against disproportionate punishment is the central substantive
guarantee of the Eighth Amendment and goes far beyond the manner of determining a defendant's
sentence.").
123. Gregg, 428 U.S. at 182-83. The Court said that capital punishment "serve[s] two principal
social purposes: retribution and deterrence[.]" Id. at 183. The Court noted, though, that incapacitation
is "[a]nother purpose that has been discussed" in the capital context. Id. at 183n.28.
124. Id. at 173.
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individual circumstances to determine whether death was actually de-
served. 125 Accordingly, the statutory scheme met the proportionality re-
quirements of the Eighth Amendment. 1 26
The Court applied both facets of individualism in its Eighth
Amendment dignity analysis in the 1976 case of Estelle v. Gamble.127 In
this case, the Court explained that, since at least Trop, it had expanded its
view of unconstitutionally cruel and unusual punishments." The Punish-
ments Clause no longer proscribes only "physically barbarous punish-
ments"; it now "embodies broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civi-
lized standards, humanity, and decency ... against which we must
evaluate penal measures." 1 29 In expounding on this broader prohibition,
the Court explained that punishments inconsistent with the "evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society" are
unconstitutional,1" and, as in Gregg, the Court explained that punish-
ments that "involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" are
prohibited, 3 ' as are those that are "grossly disproportionate to the severi-
ty of the crime."13 2 Based upon these principles, the Court found that the
government was constitutionally required to provide prisoners with ap-
propriate medical care.133 "In [the] less serious cases," the Court ex-
plained, "denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering which no
one suggests would serve any penological purpose."'3 If not serving such
a legitimate purpose, it would be pain imposed for some improper pur-
pose and constitute excessive punishment. The Court also expressed con-
cern about the humanness of the punishment in some circumstances. "In
the worst cases," it explained, a failure to provide such medical care "may
actually produce physical 'torture or a lingering death . . .""5 Allowing
an individual to suffer what could amount to such torturous conditions is
simply inhumane, and no individual should be subjected to that.
The Court reaffirmed these individualism principles of proportional-
ity and humanness-although without much analysis-in Hutto v. Fin-
ney." There, the Court reiterated that the Eighth Amendment "prohibits
125. Id. at 206-07.
126. See id. at 207.
127. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
128. See id. at 102 ("Our more recent cases ... have held that the Amendment proscribes more
than physically barbarous punishments." (citing Gregg, 428 U.S. at 171; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
100-01 (1958) (plurality opinion); and Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910)).
129. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102 (internal citations omitted).
130. Id. (quoting Trop, 356 U.S. at 101). The Court first invoked this "evolving standards of de-
cency" formulation in Trop v. Dulles. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
131. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 102-03 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 173).
132. Id. at 103 n.7. The Court also noted that the prohibition "imposes substantive limits on what
can be made criminal and punished." Id.; see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 665-67 (1962)
(setting forth this principle in striking down a law that allowed a defendant to be punished for being
"addicted to the use of narcotics").
133. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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penalties that are grossly disproportionate to the offense,... as well as
those that transgress today's broad and idealistic concepts of dignity, civi-
lized standards, humanity, and decency.""' Under these standards, the
Court assumed that the conditions in the state prison's "punitive isolation
cells" violated the Eighth Amendment.*
In its 1986 case of Ford v. Wainwright,13 the Court muddied its dig-
nity analysis somewhat. In that case, the Court struck down as unconstitu-
tional a state practice of executing "insane" persons because it failed to
meet the Eighth Amendment's demand of preserving human dignity.'"
As in previous cases, the Court examined the popularity of the punish-
ment and applied its own independent judgment to the case, assessing
whether the "punishment comport[ed] with the fundamental human dig-
nity that the Amendment protects."1 4 1 The Court explained that very few
states had authorized executing insane persons, perhaps "to protect the
dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless venge-
ance," or because the practice "simply offends humanity." 4 2 Accordingly,
it concluded that executing insane persons is indeed unconstitutional.'4 3
The Court's language here hints at a different thread of dignity-the dig-
nity of society that some scholars have found controlling.'" But, as in the
Court's earlier Eighth Amendment decisions, the conception of dignity
discussed in Ford is broader than that. It is more about the proportionali-
ty and humanness of the punishment at issue.
The Ford Court suggested that executing insane persons generally
does not meet the proportionality requirement of Eighth Amendment
dignity. Alongside its concern for society, the Court referred to avoiding
the imposition of "mindless vengeance."'4 5 Vengeance is often contrasted
with retribution, which the Court has consistently held to be a legitimate
penological purpose.'4 6 Unlike the passionless and community-based
137. Id. at 685 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
138. See id. at 681-85 (stating that there was ample evidence to support the conclusion that the
conditions in Arkansas's prisons-even outside of the punitive isolation cells-were cruel and unusu-
al).
139. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
140. Id. at 401, 406, 410.
141. Id. at 406 (citing Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977)) (plurality opinion)); see also
supra text accompanying note 74 (explaining that the Court often examines the popularity of
a punishment and then applies its own independent judgment in determining whether a pun-
ishment violates the Eighth Amendment).
142. Id. at 409-10.
143. See id. at 401.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 93-99.
145. Ford, 477 U.S. at 410.
146. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 441 (2008) ("[C]apital punishment is excessive
when it is grossly out of proportion to the crime or it does not fulfill the two distinct social purposes
served by the death penalty: retribution and deterrence of capital crimes."); Spaziano v. Florida, 468
U.S. 447, 477-78 (1984) (overruled on other grounds) ("In general, punishment may rationally be im-
posed for four reasons: (1) to rehabilitate the offender; (2) to incapacitate him from committing offens-
es in the future; (3) to deter others from committing offenses; or (4) to assuage the victim's or the
community's desire for revenge or retribution."); Austin Sarat, When Memory Speaks: Remembrance
and Revenge in Unforgiven, 77 IND. L.J. 307, 309 (2002) ("Retribution, with its advertised virtues of
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characteristics of retributivism, though, vengeance is generally passionate
in nature and is based on personal, rather than community, judgments.14 7
Not endorsed by the community, punishment based on vengeance is im-
posed for a reason inconsistent with the legitimate purposes of punish-
ment and thus runs afoul of the proportionality requirement articulated
in Gregg that "the punishment must not involve the unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain."'#
Perhaps more importantly, the Ford Court focused on the human-
ness of the punishment. According to the Court, even persons who were
sane at the time of conviction and sentencing, but who became insane on
death row-like Ford himself-should be protected from execution.1 49
This Eighth Amendment protection, then, is not premised on culpability.
In fact, in some cases, the punishment of death could arguably be a pro-
portionate response for even an insane perpetrator due to the heinous-
ness of the offense at issue. Instead, the Court suggested that care ought
to be taken to ensure that the offender understands what is happening to
him and why."' To ignore this would be to neglect the fact that the of-
fender, no matter how heinous his crime, is human and ought to be treat-
ed as such. Instead of wading into assessing culpability issues, the Court
determined that it is simply inhumane to execute these individuals who
lack ordinary capacity.
In McCleskey v. Kemp,"' a case decided in 1987, the Court ad-
dressed individualism more directly. In this case, the defendant alleged
racism in the criminal justice system and presented the Court with a study
suggesting that an offender who murdered a white victim is more likely to
be sentenced to death than an offender who murdered a black victim.'52
In addressing the defendant's Eighth Amendment claim, the Court first
acknowledged that the Amendment is rooted in "the dignity of man" and
that the Amendment continues to evolve in meaning.' It then went on to
measured proportionality, cool detachment, and consistency is contrasted with vengeance-the voice
of the other, the primitive, the savage call of unreason, a 'wildness' inside the house of law which, by
nature, will not succumb to rational forms of justice.").
147. See ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATIONS 367 (1981) ("Revenge involves a par-
ticular emotional tone, pleasure in the suffering of another, while retribution either need involve no
emotional tone, or involves another one, namely, pleasure at justice being done."); Stephanos Bibas,
Criminal (In)justice and Democracy in America, 126 HARv. L. REv. F. 134, 141 (2013) ("[Retribution]
is a reflective, impartial, proportional moral judgment, while [revenge] is a hot, unchecked passion.");
Ryan, supra note 103, at 1053-56 (distinguishing retributivism and vengeance); see also Meghan J.
Ryan, Taking Another Look at Second-Look Sentencing, 81 BROOK. L. REv. 149, 173 (2015) ("A sen-
tencing decision inflamed by passion could be more akin to one made out of vengeance than one root-
ed in retributivism, which is based on passionless and community-based notions of desert.").
148. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. at 1153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion).
149. See Ford, 477 U.S. at 401-03.
150. See id. at 410, 417; see also Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 957 (2007) (detailing the Jus-
tices' opinions in Ford and suggesting that the competency standard under the decision is something
along the lines of comprehending the reasons for the execution or determining whether the offender is
aware of why he is to be executed).
151. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
152. See id. at 286.
153. See id. at 300 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 256 U.S. 86,99 (1958) (plurality opinion)).
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discuss the importance of attaining proportionality through individualized
sentencing.154 In particular, the Court suggested that a punishment im-
posed pursuant to procedures that focus sentencers' discretion "on the
particularized nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of
the individual defendant" comports with Eighth Amendment demands.'
Because the sentencing procedures at issue required consideration of the
individual offender and his offense, and the defendant's sentence was not
disproportionate, there was no Eighth Amendment violation here.' 6
In 1988, a plurality of the Court again referred to the proportionality
facet of individualism in Thompson v. Oklahoma.'7 In that case, the plu-
rality used the concept in its discussion of the purposes of punishment,
finding that neither retribution nor deterrence-the purposes justifying
capital punishment- could support executing fifteen-year-old offend-
ers."' In analyzing retribution, the plurality quoted its language from
Gregg that retribution is "not 'inconsistent with our respect for the digni-
ty of men."`1 9 When dealing with such young offenders, however, the plu-
rality suggested that retribution cannot justify capital punishment;'60 a fif-
teen-year-old's ability to grow and change suggests that he is less culpable
than traditional offenders committing capital crimes and simply cannot be
culpable enough such that imposing the death penalty would be a propor-
tionate response.161 In this way, the plurality examined proportionality by
assessing the particular characteristics of the class of offenders of which
the defendant was a part. Although the plurality was not focusing specifi-
cally on Mr. Thompson, the plurality, by creating a more expansive hold-
ing-that no one under sixteen years of age could be executed-was pro-
tecting an even broader swath of individual offenders. This prophylactic
rule better protects against disproportionality that would be in violation
of the Eighth Amendment dignity demand.
The 1992 Hudson v. McMillian Court focused primarily on propor-
tionality in determining the constitutionality of a prison guard's use of
force against an inmate.162 The guard's culpability was essential in this in-
quiry, the Court explained, because, if the prison guard was employing
excessive physical force, then it could amount to imposing undeserved
punishment, which would be disproportionate and thus violate the Eighth
Amendment.16 Despite this focus on proportionality, though, the Court
154. See id. at 301-19.
155. See id. at 308; see also id. at 311-12 (stating that "[t]he capital sentencing decision requires the
individual jurors to focus their collective judgment on the unique characteristics of a particular criminal
defendant" and that the concept of "individualized justice is 'firmly entrenched in American law."').
156. See id. at 306-12.
157. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
158. See id. at 836-37.
159. Id. at 836 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183 (1976) (plurality opinion)).
160. See id. at 836-37.
161. See id. at 834-36.
162. See Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 5-7 (1992).
163. See id.
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also spoke more broadly, reiterating that the "concepts of dignity, civi-
lized standards, humanity, and decency ... animate the Eighth Amend-
ment."', The Court, then, was true to not only the proportionality aspect
of the individualism dignity concept, but it also embraced the perhaps
more nebulous humanness component of the concept.
Elaborating on the themes of individualism, including both propor-
tionality and humanness, the Hope v. Pelzerl65 Court found that hitching
an inmate to a post for a seven-hour period in intense heat, and without
allowing the prisoner to drink water or use the restroom, was unconstitu-
tional because it did not serve a legitimate penological purpose.'" Alt-
hough the offender deserved his sentence of imprisonment, this hitching-
post practice employed by the prison guards constituted "gratuitous in-
fliction of 'wanton and unnecessary' pain.""' It was "painful, ... degrad-
ing and dangerous,"16 and this additional punishment was undeserved. It
was thus disproportionate and, even though the Court did not explicitly
say so, could be said to be inhumane and uncivilized as well.
The Court similarly has continued to invoke dignity in its more re-
cent Atkins v. Virginia, 9 Roper v. Simmons,7 0 and Kennedy v. Louisi-
ana'7 ' decisions, and thus the Court has continued to discuss the im-
portance of individualism under the Eighth Amendment. In Atkins, the
Court considered dignity in conjunction with examining "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 7 ' It
then moved on to "[p]roportionality review" and its survey of legislative-
ly authorized punishments among the states.173 In Roper, the Court ex-
plained thatthe Eighth Amendment "reaffirms the duty of the govern-
ment to respect the dignity of all persons."1 74 Again, this is focusing on
offenders as human beings. The Court declared this directly after explain-
ing the requirement to avoid excessive punishment-a command that
flows from the "basic precept of justice that punishment for crime should
be graduated and proportioned to the offense.""' Next, in Kennedy, the
Court again referred to the importance of "express[ing] respect for the
164. Id. at 11 (internal quotations omitted).
165. 536 U.S. 730 (2002).
166. See id. at 733-35, 737.
167. Id. at 738.
168. Id. at 745; see also id. at 738 (stating that the practice subjected the inmate "to a substantial
risk of physical harm, to unnecessary pain caused by the handcuffs and the restricted position of con-
finement for a 7-hour period, to unnecessary exposure to the heat of the sun, to prolonged thirst and
taunting, and to a deprivation of bathroom breaks that created a risk of particular discomfort and hu-
miliation.").
169. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
170. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
171. 554 U.S. 407 (2008).
172. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311-12 ("The basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is nothing
less than the dignity of man. The Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.") (internal citations and quotations omitted)).
173. Id. at 312; see supra text accompanying note 73.
174. Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
175. See id. (quoting Atkins, 536 U.S. at 311) (internal quotations omitted).
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dignity of the person.""17 And, consistent with the other cases, the Court
discussed this alongside its review of proportionality and the various pur-
poses of punishment.'77 The Court stated that "punishment is justified un-
der one or more of three principal rationales: rehabilitation, deterrence,
and retribution.""' It explained that retribution is the most problematic
of these justifying purposes, as it "often can contradict the law's own
ends.""1 7 The Court noted that "[t]his is of particular concern when the
Court interprets the meaning of the Eighth Amendment in capital cases.
When the law punishes by death, it risks its own sudden descent into bru-
tality, transgressing the constitutional commitment to decency and re-
straint.""' As in Ford, the Court may be alluding to the importance of
protecting society from imposing brutal punishments,' 8 ' but it remains the
dignity of the person, the individual, that is paramount in these cases.
In its 2011 case of Brown v. Plata,"' the Court went further to high-
light the humanness component of dignity.1' There, the Court examined
the constitutionality of the overcrowded prison conditions in California.al
It emphasized that, although prisoners "may be deprived of rights that
are fundamental to liberty," they "retain the essence of human dignity
inherent in all persons."" The Court thus focused on the fact that prison-
ers are humans and must be treated in a way that respects this. It ex-
plained that the government must provide prisoners with sustenance-
such as food, water, and medical care-because failure to do so could re-
sult in torture or a lingering death-circumstances prohibited by the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition on excessiveness.'" This, the Court ex-
plained, would be entirely "incompatible with the concept of human dig-
nity and has no place in civilized society.""'
Most recently, the Court relied on the concept of dignity in its 2014
Hall v. Florida'* case, which tightened state procedural requirements for
determining when an offender is intellectually disabled such that he may
not be executed.'89 Highlighting the humanness facet of individualism, the





181. See supra text accompanying notes 145-48.
182. 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
183. See id. at 510.
184. See generally id. at 499-510 (describing the issues involved, and the procedural posture, in the
case).
185. Id. at 510.
186. See id.
187. Id. at 511.
188. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
189. See generally id. (reversing the Florida Supreme Court decision). In Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct.
1986, (2014), the Court reviewed what procedural requirements were necessary in determining that an
offender was intellectually disabled such that, pursuant to Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), he
could not be executed. Florida law determined that an individual was intellectually disabled if he had
an IQ test score of 70 or below. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1990, 1994. Florida interpreted this to mean that
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Court stated that the Eighth Amendment protects "the dignity of all per-
sons"-"even those convicted of heinous crimes"-and that the govern-
ment is obliged to respect their dignity.190 Moreover, our understanding of
an individual offender's dignity is not stagnant based on the principles of
our nation's Founders."' Instead, our protection of individual dignity
changes and grows as society evolves.'" The Hall Court implemented this
understanding of dignity by taking a more nuanced approach to the cate-
gorical rule in Atkins that "mentally retarded" offenders cannot constitu-
tionally be executed.19 ' The Hall Court delved into how intellectual disa-
bility should be assessed at the individual level and suggested that these
determinations should be based on a broader swath of individual offend-
er evidence than just IQ score.19 4 In sum, the Court again determined that
concern for the individual offender is paramount in these Eighth
Amendment analyses.
These cases in which the Court has explicitly invoked the concept of
dignity focus on themes of individualism and, often more specifically,
proportionality and the humanness of the offender. In assessing propor-
tionality, the Court has looked at possible purposes of the punishment as
in Gregg."' It has also examined prison officials' explicit motivations for
punishment as in Hudson.'" Both of these assessments are aimed at de-
termining why a punishment is being imposed. If an offender is being
punished for a reason unrelated to his offense, it suggests that the pun-
ishment is unjustified. The Court has also highlighted that punishment
must respect the humanness of the offender. As it stated in Brown, pun-
ishment must "retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all per-
sons."'" In examining this relationship between the offender and his pun-
ishment, the Court has emphasized the importance of looking closely at
the particular offense at issue and the individual offender's unique char-
acteristics and circumstances. This careful concern for the individual of-
fender in the Court's invocation of Eighth Amendment dignity is con-
sistent with the minimum core of dignity-that the individual offender
should be treated as an end rather than merely as a means to achieve
a defendant was required to present an IQ test score of 70 or below before presenting any additional
evidence of his intellectual disability. See id. at 1992. The Supreme Court found that this approach vio-
lated the Eighth Amendment because it does not take into account the applicable standard of error in
assessing 10 scores. See id. at 1994.
190. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1992.
191. See id.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 1990, 1993; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321.
194. See Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 1999-2001.
195. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 183-84 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also supra text ac-
companying notes 116-26.
196. Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1992) ("[W]e hold that whenever prison officials stand
accused of using excessive physical force in violation of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
the core judicial inquiry is . . . whether force was applied in a good-faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline, or maliciously and sadistically to cause harm."); see also supra notes 163-65 and accompany-
ing text.
197. Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011).
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some other end.t" Eighth Amendment dignity is concerned with the indi-
vidual offender; the individual offender cannot be ignored in imposing
punishment.
There is also a thread of societal concern incorporated into the
Court's Eighth Amendment dignity cases. For example, in Ford, the
Court referenced "protect[ing] the dignity of society itself."19" Indeed, it is
this strain of Eighth Amendment dignity that Henry and Buchhandler-
Raphael extracted when attempting to define dignity.2w But this is only a
small piece of the Court's conception of Eighth Amendment dignity. At
the heart of the Court's conception is the importance of focusing on the
individual offender rather than on societal concerns. In this sense, Hen-
ry's and Buchhandler-Raphael's understandings of the Court's Eighth
Amendment dignity conception are askew. Henry cited just five cases
supporting her societally focused view of Eighth Amendment dignity.201
In three of these cases, the language Henry cited-that the punishment
violates the "dignity of man,"2 that the Eighth Amendment prohibition
"secure[s] individual freedom and preserve[s] human dignity,"203 and that
the punishment is "antithetical to human dignity"2"-does not seem to
support this societally based view of dignity over any other view. In one
of the five cases-Ford v. Wainwright-she highlighted the Court's lan-
guage that, in prohibiting the execution of "insane" individuals, the Court
sought "to protect the dignity of society itself from the barbarity of exact-
ing mindless vengeance."20 5 This does seem to tie Eighth Amendment
dignity to societal concerns. The last of the five cases that Henry quoted,
though, arguably takes the opposite position. Henry highlighted the lan-
guage in the Court's 2011 Brown v. Plata case, in which the Court empha-
sized that prisoners, despite being convicted, "retain the essence of hu-
man dignity inherent in all persons."206 In this case, the Court seemed to
focus on the individual rather than society, thus raising questions about
this "collective virtue" version of dignity that Henry argued is at the heart
of the Court's Eighth Amendment dignity jurisprudence. Buchhandler-
Raphael similarly invoked the Court's language in support of her own
societally focused view of Eighth Amendment dignity.2 07 She quoted the
198. See supra text accompanying notes 29-30.
199. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 410 (1986).
200. See supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
201. See Henry, supra note 45, at 222-26.
202. Henry, supra note 45, at 223-24 (quoting Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304,311 (2002)).
203. Id. at 224 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005)).
204. Id. at 319 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745 (2002)).
205. Id. at 223 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,410 (1986)).
206. Id. at 225 (quoting Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493, 510 (2011)).
207. See Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 28, at 317-19 (quoting Hope, 536 U.S. at 745). More
specifically, Professor Buchhandler-Raphael explained that the cases she cited, "[t]aken together, ....
suggest that there are some fundamental standards of decency that command the government's protec-
tion of the dignity of individuals, and they are best captured in the notion of communitarian virtue." E-
mail from Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Washington and Lee
University School of Law, to author (June 17, 2016) (on file with author).
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Court's language in Hope v. Pelzer that the punishment at issue was "an-
tithetical to human dignity"2" and its language in Brown that prisoners
"retain the essence of human dignity inherent in all persons."1 2"a She also
pointed to the Court's language in Roper v. Simmons,2 10 in which the
Court stated that constitutional "doctrines and guarantees are central to
the American experience and remain essential to our present-day self-
definition and national identity," 2 11 as well as to Justice Brennan's concur-
rence in Furman v. Georgia that the Eighth Amendment "prohibits the
infliction of uncivilized and inhuman punishments."2 12 None of these pas-
sages, though, supports the societal view of dignity under the Eighth
Amendment. The Court's language in Hope refers only generally to dig-
nity. The Brown Court's reference to dignity of the individual. The
Court's language in Roper is referring to the importance and relevance of
constitutional protections since the founding of this nation. And Justice
Brennan's language in Furman suggests only that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits uncivilized and inhumane punishments; it does not suggest
whether this is for the purpose of protecting the individual offender or
society. Moreover, this was not language embraced by a majority of the
Court in Furman.
Eighth Amendment dignity focuses primarily on the importance of
the individual offender as a human being, but Eighth Amendment dignity
may certainly be broader than this minimum core. Just because a pun-
ishment accounts for the individual offender does not mean that the pun-
ishment is constitutional. But if a punishment is imposed with disregard
for the individual offender, it runs afoul of the Eighth Amendment digni-
ty demand.
B. The Individuality Core of the Eighth Amendment
The Court's invocation of dignity in its Eighth Amendment cases
and those cases' focus on individualism is indicative of much of the
Court's overall Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. In some respects, the
Court's Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is a bit of a mess.213 Despite
the Court's general method of state-counting and applying its own inde-
208. Buchandler-Raphael, supra note 28, at 319 (quoting Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 745
(2002)).
209. Id. (quoting Brown, 563 U.S. at 510).
210. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
211. Buchhandler-Raphael, supra note 28, at 318 (quoting Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578
(2005)).
212. Id. (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 270 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
213. Castiglione, supra note 9, at 75 ("It has become conventional wisdom that Eighth Amend-
ment proportionality jurisprudence is a mess."); Meghan J. Ryan, The Missing Jury: The Neglected Role
ofJuries in Eighth Amendment Punishments Clause Determinations, 64 FLA. L. REV. 549, 558-59 (2012)
(stating that the Court's inconsistency in the factors it relies on in its Punishments Clause cases "has led
scholars to throw up their hands in exasperation and has created an unpredictable Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence."); Stacy, supra note 9, at 476 ("The Court's jurisprudence under the Eighth Amend-
ment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause stands in disarray.").
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pendent judgment,214 the ways in which the Court applies these tech-
niques in any given case can sometimes be perplexing. While the Court's
jurisprudence is no beacon of clarity, dividing the Court's Eighth
Amendment cases into five different classes-procedural cases, type-of-
offense cases, class-of-offender cases, method-of-punishment cases, and
prison-condition cases-can provide greater clarity to the Court's juris-
prudence in the area. In each these classes, the Court is concerned about
individualism and viewing the offender as an end rather than as a means.
1. Procedural Cases
The Eighth Amendment procedural cases examine how a sentence
is imposed and assess whether this comports with the Eighth Amend-
ment. These cases are generally death penalty cases, and they stress the
importance of individualization in sentencing. In Woodson v. North Caro-
lina,215 for example, a plurality of the Court determined that a mandatory
imposition of capital punishment for offenders who were convicted of
first-degree murder is unconstitutional because it does not allow consid-
eration of the details of the offense committed or the particular charac-
teristics of the individual committing the offense.216 The Eighth Amend-
ment requires more: it requires sentencers to look into the facts of the
crime and the characteristics of the perpetrator to determine whether
death is really appropriate in the capital case. The Woodson plurality ex-
plained that the mandatory death penalty at issue unconstitutionally
"fail[ed] to allow the particularized consideration of relevant aspects of
the character and record of each convicted defendant before the imposi-
tion upon him of a sentence of death." 2 17 Such a process, the plurality ex-
plained, "treats all persons convicted of a designated offense not as
uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undiffer-
entiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of
death." 2 18 Quoting precedent, the plurality stated that, "[f]or the determi-
nation of sentences, justice generally requires consideration of more than
the particular acts by which the crime was committed and that there be
taken into account the circumstances of the offense together with the
character and propensities of the offender." 2 1 9 It explained that individu-
alization of sentencing is "progressive and humanizing," and that:
214. The Court's traditional approach to questions of cruel and unusual punishment is to first sur-
vey the number of states adopting or prohibiting the punishment practice at issue, and then to apply
the Court's own independent judgment to determine whether the practice is unconstitutionally cruel
and unusual. See Meghan J. Ryan, Judging Cruelty, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 81, 85-88 (2010); Ryan, su-
pra note 77, at 586-91; supra note 78.
215. 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion).
216. See generally id. (finding the petitioners' mandatory death sentences unconstitutional).
217. Id. at 303.
218. Id. at 304.
219. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania ex rel. Sullivan v. Ashe, 302 U.S. 51, 55 (1937)).
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[w]hile the prevailing practice of individualizing sentencing deter-
minations generally reflects simply enlightened policy rather than a
constitutional imperative. . . in capital cases the fundamental re-
spect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires con-
sideration of the character and record of the individual offender and
the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally in-
dispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.o
Despite the Woodson plurality's suggestion that individualization in
sentencing is a constitutional demand only in capital cases, in recent years
the Court has expanded this individualization requirement to non-capital
sentences in some circumstances. For example, in Miller v. Alabama, 221
the Court also stressed the importance of individualization in sentencing
under the Eighth Amendment when it struck down a mandatory sentence
of life without the possibility of parole for juveniles who commit nonhom-
icide offenses22 Although the Court partially relied on the special status
of juveniles-their characteristics as impulsive, neurocognitively unde-
veloped, and capable of rehabilitation-in reaching its decision, the Court
stressed the importance of individualization in sentencing under the
Eighth Amendment. 2" Similarly, in its 2011 case of Pepper v. United
States,24 the Court highlighted the importance of considering a defend-
ant's individual post-sentencing rehabilitation in formulating a new non-
capital sentence at resentencing." Like the Court's reasoning in the capi-
tal and life-without-parole contexts, the Pepper Court explained that it
has been a tradition in this country for courts to consider defendants as
individuals and that a punishment should fit not only the crime but also
the individual offender. 2 6 The Pepper Court did not root its decision in
Eighth Amendment dignity, but the tradition on which the Pepper Court
relied-the tradition that the offender be treated as an individual-seems
to be rooted in our general sense of human dignity.2"
Further, the individualization demand articulated in Woodson is
spreading beyond just the capital context as the Supreme Court continues
to whittle away at its "death is different" jurisprudence. 2 28 The Court's
220. Id. (citations omitted).
221. 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).
222. See id. at 2463-64, 2469.
223. See id. at 2463-69 (stating that individualized sentencing is required when such a serious pun-
ishment is to be imposed on juveniles).
224. 562 U.S. 476 (2011).
225. See id. at 492-93.
226. See id. at 487-88. The Pepper Court stated:
It has been uniform and constant in the federal judicial tradition for the sentencing judge to con-
sider every convicted person as an individual and every case as a unique study in the human fail-
ings that sometimes mitigate, sometimes magnify, the crime and the punishment to ensue. Under-
lying this tradition is the principle that the punishment should fit the offender and not merely the
crime.
Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted).
227. See id.
228. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 103 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("'Death is different'
no longer."); Ryan, supra note 31, at 1233-34 (explaining that in recent cases the Court has "upended
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holding in Miller was based on prior cases in which the Court had ex-
plained why capital cases should not always stand alone in being treated
by the Court with greater scrutiny.229 In Graham v. Florida,", for example,
the Court suggested that its Eighth Amendment approach is based on the
type of Eighth Amendment argument being made rather than on whether
capital punishment is at issue in the case.23 ' The Court thus afforded less
deference to the state in determining that the punishment of life without
parole was unconstitutional as applied to a nonhomicide offender. 2 A -
ter Graham and Miller, then, death no longer seems to be so different
such that alternative rules should apply in the capital context.
Finally, if Eighth Amendment dignity demands that capital offend-
ers be treated as individual human beings, it only makes sense to treat
less serious offenders as equally human. One might still argue that death
remains different in some respects-arguments that may no longer hold
water233-but one of the reasons society looks askance at offenders is be-
cause of the horrendous crimes they have committed. Indeed, some of-
fenders have been likened to animals3? If we must respect the dignity of
even the worst offenders by treating them as individual human beings,
then consistency would suggest that we must similarly respect the dignity
its long-held conclusion that different rules apply in the capital context than in non-capital cases[,] ...
cutting back on its 'death is different' jurisprudence" ). For a summary of the Court's traditional "death
is different" jurisprudence, see Meghan J. Ryan, Does Stare Decisis Apply in the Eighth Amendment
Death Penalty Context?, 85 N.C. L. REv. 847, 859-61 (2007).
229. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2463, 2466-67 (2012).
230. 560 U.S. 48.
231. See id. at 59-62.
232. See id. at 61-62.
233. Death has been said to be different because of its severity and finality. See Furman v. Geor-
gia, 408 U.S. 238, 289 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring). But the Supreme Court has indicated that other
punishments, such as life without the possibility of parole, are likewise incredibly severe, see Graham,
560 U.S. at 69, and the Court has struck down other punishments like denationalization, see Trop v.
Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (plurality opinion), while upholding the practice of capital punishment,
see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 (1976) (plurality opinion). Justice Stewart found death to be
different in kind rather than degree. See Furman, 408 U.S. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring). He found
the punishment to be "unique in its total irrevocability" and "in its rejection of rehabilitation of the
convict as a basic purpose of criminal justice." Id. While we are unable to raise the dead, however, we
are similarly unable to give back years spent in prison, making terms of imprisonment irrevocable as
well. Further, although it is commonly thought that death cannot serve rehabilitative goals, imposition
of the death penalty was originally used in this country to do just that. See Ryan, supra note 31, at
1246-49. Further, remnants of the rehabilitative effects of a death sentence can be seen in anecdotes of
death row inmates like Karla Faye Tucker being transformed as she awaited execution and also in legal
doctrines such as the dying declaration, which is premised on those facing death to be truthful because
they would not want to die with a lie on their lips. See id. at 1249-57. Finally, some Justices have sug-
gested that death is different because it "is uniquely degrading to human dignity." Furman, 408 U.S. at
290-91 (Brennan, J., concurring); see also id. at 306 (Stewart, J., concurring) (stating that capital pun-
ishment is unique "in its absolute renunciation of all that is embodied in our concept of humanity.").
Failing to be concerned about the individual offender, however-in any context-is a failure to respect
his dignity.
234. See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 178-83 (1986) (finding on habeas review that
the prosecutor's reference to the defendant as an animal at trial "did not deprive petitioner of a fair
trial"); People v. Garcia, 258 P.3d 751, 787-88 (Cal. 2011) (noting that the prosecutor repeatedly re-
ferred to the defendant as an animal during the sentencing phase of a capital trial and finding this un-
problematic).
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of offenders outside of the capital realm. Individualism remains im-
portant in all of these cases.
2. Type-of-Offense Cases
Type-of-offense cases deal with whether a particular punishment is
appropriate for a certain offense or class of offenses. For example, does it
violate the Eighth Amendment to execute someone for raping a child?35
Does the Eighth Amendment bar a sentence of life imprisonment with-
out the possibility of parole for the crime of uttering a $100 "no account"
check when the offender has previously been convicted of six other non-
violent feloniesW 6 These cases often focus on whether the punishment is
proportionate to the offense committed. In assessing proportionality, the
Court has, in some of these cases, waded deeply into the facts to examine
the offender's previous offenses. In Ewing v. California27 for example,
the Court looked at the twenty-five-years-to-life sentence imposed for
Mr. Ewing's crime of felony grand theft. While this punishment may
seem extreme, the Justices explained that the offender had previously
committed at least two serious or violent felonies.23 Accounting for the
legitimate "public-safety interest in incapacitating and deterring recidivist
felons," a plurality of the Court determined that Mr. Ewing's offense was
not grossly disproportionate to the long sentence.2 40 Moreover, a majority
of the Justices found proportionality exceptionally important in these
type-of-offense cases.2 4 1 As in the Court's cases that explicitly invoke dig-
nity, these type-of-offense cases' focus on proportionality generally re-
quires the Court to look closely at the individual and the offense(s) he
committed, thus requiring an individualization in sentencing akin to that
seen in the Court's Eighth Amendment procedural cases.
In some type-of-offense cases, the Court has looked at only the of-
fense committed and not at the offender at the center of the case when
assessing proportionality. For example, when the Court concluded that it
is unconstitutional to execute someone for the crime of child rape, the
Court created a bright-line rule based on the offense committed. 2 In no
case, then, would capital punishment be appropriate for raping a child.
No characteristic possessed by an offender-whether he had raped a doz-
en children or worshipped Satan -could render him eligible for the death
penalty as punishment for this offense. While these cases do not wade in-
to the facts, they determine that the punishment could never be propor-
235. In Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008), the Court held that, yes, it is unconstitutional
to execute someone for having committed this offense. See id. at 413.
236. See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,296,303 (1983).
237. 538 U.S. 11 (2003) (plurality opinion).
238. See id. at 20.
239. See id. at 28.
240. Id. at 29-31.
241. See id. at 30-31; id. at 36-37 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
242. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407,413 (2008).
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tionate to the offense at issue. They provide prophylactic rules to protect
the individual offenders, regardless of who those individual offenders are.
3. Class-of- Offender Cases
Class-of-offender cases focus on whether a certain category of of-
fender is eligible to be sentenced to a particular punishment. For exam-
ple, the Supreme Court has held that several different types of offend-
ers-"insane" persons, intellectually disabled persons, and juvenile
offenders -cannot constitutionally be executed.2 4 3 Like the type-of-
offense cases, these cases focus on proportionality, but here they hone in
on the offender's probable culpability and capacity-taking into account
the class of offender's decision-making abilities and comprehension, neu-
rological development, impulsivity, and the like -rather than concentrate
on the seriousness of the offense. For example, in finding it unconstitu-
tional to execute intellectually disabled persons, the Atkins v. Virginia
Court relied on these offenders' "cognitive and behavioral impair-
ments"-such as their "diminished ability to understand and process in-
formation, to learn from experience, to engage in logical reasoning, or to
control impulses" -which lessen their culpabilities.?" Similarly, in Roper
v. Simmons24 5 the Court relied on juvenile offenders' "lack of maturity
and ... underdeveloped sense of responsibility"; "vulnerab[ility] or sus-
ceptib[ility] to negative influences and outside pressures, including peer
pressure"; and generally unformed characters in determining that they
could not constitutionally be executed." These punishments again focus
on proportionality between the offender's desert and the punishment im-
posed. In a sense, the inquiry is even more offender-based than in type-
of-offense cases because it looks at the very human qualities of the of-
fenders at issue. Like some of the type-of-offense cases, though, class-of-
offender cases are generally prophylactic in nature. In this way they focus
less on the individual offender in the particular case but instead concen-
trate on a broad class of offenders to provide even greater protection to
individual dignity.
4. Method-of-Punishment Cases
Method-of-punishment cases focus less on the proportionality of the
punishment in a particular case and instead on whether the punishment,
or the particular procedures involved in any punishment, should ever be
an available sentencing option under our Constitution. These cases exam-
ine whether the particular punishment method and its procedures are un-
243. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 401 (1986); see Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct. 1986, 1990 (2014);
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 578 (2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002).
244. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319-20. These "cognitive and behavioral impairments" also lessen the de-
terrence value of the punishment. Id.
245. 543 U.S. 551.
246. Id. at 568-75.
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constitutional.247 Most of these cases are focused on the death penalty: Is
electrocution a cruel and unusual method of implementing capital pun-
ishment?"m Is the three-drug cocktail that has traditionally been used to
carry out lethal injection unconstitutionally cruel and unusual?249 Are the
more recent techniques that states have employed to carry out lethal in-
jection constitutional?250 While the Court has never found any method of
capital punishment to violate the Eighth Amendment,215 it has empha-
sized in its method-of-punishment cases that torturous punishments, or
those to which "terror, pain, or disgrace were ... superadded," are un-
constitutional.25 2 In more recent method-of-punishment cases, the Court
has focused more specifically on the degree of risk of suffering pain, the
magnitude of that pain, and available alternatives to carry out the pun-
ishment.253 This attention to inflicting terror, pain, and disgrace for a pur-
pose not necessary to put the defendant to death is in accord with the
Court's general proportionality analysis. 25 4 Although the Court has issued
247. This class of cases includes both methods of punishment-such as lethal injection broadly-
and the procedures, or "techniques" employed in that method-such as a particular cocktail used to
carry out lethal injection. The "prison condition cases" also relate to the procedures or techniques used
in carrying out a term of imprisonment. See infra Part III.B.5.
248. See generally Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (plurality opinion) (examining wheth-
er a criminal offender could be put to death by electrocution when the first attempt to execute him by
electrocution failed); In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890) (upholding the practice of electrocution).
249. See generally Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (2008) (plurality opinion) (upholding a common
three-drug lethal injection protocol).
250. See generally Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (upholding Oklahoma's three-drug le-
thal injection cocktail of midazolam, a paralytic (vecuronium bromide, pancuronium bromide, or rocu-
ronium bromide), and potassium chloride).
251. See id. at 2732 ("While methods of execution have changed over the years, this Court has
never invalidated a State's chosen procedure for carrying out a sentence of death as the infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment." (internal quotations, alterations, and citations omitted)). But in Trop
v. Dulles, the Court struck down the punishment of denationalization. See 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)
(plurality opinion).
252. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135-36 (1878); see also Baze, 553 U.S. at 48 ("What each of
the forbidden punishments [in the Court's previous cases] had in common was the deliberate infliction
of pain for the sake of pain-'superadding' pain to the death sentence through torture and the like."
(internalalterations omitted)).
253. See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2738 ("Our first ground for affirmance is based on petitioners' fail-
ure to satisfy their burden of establishing that any risk of harm was substantial when compared to a
known and available alternative method of execution."); Baze, 553 U.S. at 61 (stating that a defendant
"must show that the risk is substantial when compared to the known and available alternatives."); Ba-
ze, 553 U.S. at 107 (Breyer, J., concurring) (concluding that "the relevant question [is] whether the
method creates an untoward, readily avoidable risk of inflicting severe and unnecessary suffering."). In
Baze v. Rees, for example, seven of the Justices determined that courts should consider the degree of
risk of suffering pain, the magnitude of that pain, and available alternatives to carry out the punish-
ment. See 553 U.S. at 51 (Roberts, J.) (indicating that a defendant may succeed on an Eighth Amend-
ment challenge if he can establish that alternative procedures "effectively address a substantial risk of
serious harm"); id. at 87 (Stevens, J., concurring) ("Under [the Court's] precedents, whether as inter-
preted by THE CHIEF JUSTICE or Justice GINSBURG, I am persuaded that the evidence adduced
by petitioners fails to prove that Kentucky's lethal injection protocol violates the Eighth Amend-
ment."); id. at 107-08 (Breyer J., concurring) ("I agree that the relevant factors-the 'degree of risk,'
the 'magnitude of pain,' and 'availability of alternatives'-are interrelated and each must be consid-
ered."); id. at 116 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("I agree with ... the plurality that the degree of risk, mag-
nitude of pain, and availability of alternatives must be considered. I part ways with the plurality, how-
ever, to the extent its 'substantial risk' test sets a fixed threshold for the first factor.").
254. See supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
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broad prophylactic holdings in these cases as well, the Court is still at-
tuned to the reason the punishment was imposed because, again, punish-
ment added for a reason not associated with the basic purposes of pun-
ishment results in disproportionality and thus runs afoul of the Eighth
Amendment dignity demand. Thus, while a severe punishment like death
is constitutional, and while this punishment "inherent[ly]" involves
"[s]ome risk of pain,""5 at some point that risk of pain can become so
great that the method of execution is unconstitutional.26 Although it is
acceptable to impose death,"7 it is unacceptable to wantonly inflict pain
because this amounts to disproportionality. 25 8 These prophylactic rules al-
so touch on the humanness facet of the Court's dignity requirement. In
no cases are these torturous punishments available under the Constitu-
tion.
5. Prison-Condition Cases
Finally, prison-condition cases focus almost exclusively on how the
practice of punishment is carried out. These cases are unique in that they
ordinarily arise in a slightly different procedural context than the other
classes of Eighth Amendment cases. Instead of arising in post-conviction
proceedings, prison-condition cases usually arise in civil 42 U.S.C. § 1983
cases instead? 9 These are also the cases in which the Court most consist-
ently invokes the concept of Eighth Amendment dignity.260
255. See Baze, 533 U.S. at 47.
256. See generally id. (upholding the traditional three-drug method of lethal injection and setting
forth a constitutional standard that a punishment is unconstitutional when there is "a 'substantial risk
of serious harm,' an 'objectively intolerable risk of harm,"' at least when compared to available alterna-
tives); see also id. at 116-17 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (setting forth a lower threshold for unconstitu-
tionality); id. at 87 (Stevens, J., concurring) (accepting either the plurality's standard or that set forth
by Justice Ginsburg in dissent); id. at 107-08 (Breyer, J., concurring) (adopting the standard set forth
by Justice Ginsburg).
257. Facts are accumulating, however, such that there might soon be a determination that capital
punishment has become unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment. See Meghan J. Ryan, On the
Road to Abolition: The Uncertain Future of Capital Punishment in the United States, JURIST (Feb. 24,
2016), http://www.jurist.org/forum/2Ol6/02/meghan-ryan-capital-punishment.php.
258. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (plurality opinion) (stating that "[a] penal-
ty .. . must accord with 'the dignity of man,' which is the 'basic concept underlying the Eighth Amend-
ment"' and that "[t]his means, at least, that the punishment not be 'excessive"' -that it "not involve the
unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" and that it "not be grossly out of proportion to the severity
of the crime" (internal citations omitted)); supra text accompanying notes 103-06.
259. See, e.g., Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 735 (2002) (noting that the plaintiff "filed suit un-
der ... 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ... against three guards ... ,one of whom also handcuffed him to the hitching
post."); Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 4 (1992) ("Hudson sued the three corrections officers in Fed-
eral District Court under ... 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of the Eighth Amendment's prohibi-
tion on cruel and unusual punishments and seeking compensatory damages.").
260. The Court explicitly invoked Eighth Amendment dignity in the prison condition cases of
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S.678 (1978), Hudson, 503 U.S. 1,
Hope, 536 U.S. 730, and Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011). It also explicitly invoked Eighth
Amendment dignity in the procedural cases of Gregg, 428 U.S. 153, and McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S.
279 (1987); the type-of-offense case of Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407 (2008); the class-of-offender
cases of Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399 (1986), Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988), Atkins
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Perhaps recognizing the uniqueness of these cases, the Court applies
a different analytical framework to prison-condition cases. Instead of re-
lying on state- or jurisdiction-counting and applying its own independent
judgment like the Court does in many of its other Eighth Amendment
cases,' here the Court has sorted prison condition into two groups and
then applied unique analyses in each of these types of cases. In the first
category-the medical-care cases-the Court has determined that prison
authorities' "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prison-
ers" constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment.2 6 2 In the second category-the excessive-force cases-the
Court has found it unconstitutional for prison authorities to "maliciously
and sadistically use force to cause harm" to prisoners.26 3 These are ad hoc
analyses in which the examining courts look at the individual facts of each
case to determine the constitutionality of the government action (or inac-
tion).
Even within this unique group of cases, though, we see the Court
again referencing the importance of individualism in relation to Eighth
Amendment dignity. In both the medical-care cases and the excessive-
force cases, the Court is concerned about the prison officials' purposes
behind their actions: Were they deliberately indifferent toward the in-
mate's basic needs?2" Or were they maliciously and sadistically employing
force against the inmate?2 65 As in Gregg and other Eighth Amendment
cases explicitly invoking the dignity demand, this purpose is integrally re-
lated to proportionality. 2" If the officers were acting maliciously or sadis-
tically, they were imposing pain independently rather than as part of le-
gally sanctioned punishment. If the government was deliberately
indifferent to an inmate's medical needs, it was, in effect, imposing puni-
tive treatment similarly outside the bounds of legal punishment. These
prison-condition cases go beyond just the concern for proportionality,
though; they focus on whether the prisoner has been treated humanely.
In Estelle v. Gamble, for example, the Court explained that deliberately
acting indifferent toward an inmate's serious medical need is "simply in-
v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), and Hall v. Florida, 134 S. Ct.
1986 (2014); and the method-of-punishment case of Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
261. See supra text accompanying notes 78, 214.
262. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104.
263. Hudson, 503 U.S. at 6-7.
264. See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104. In some medical care cases, the Court has been unclear in its
Eighth Amendment analysis. In Brown v. Plata, for example, the Court concluded that the results of
overcrowded prisons in California amounted to "ongoing violations of the Cruel and Unusual Punish-
ments Clause," and, although the Court set forth the shocking and disturbing conditions of the prisons
at issue, it did not clearly engage in straightforward constitutional analysis to explain how it reached
this conclusion. 563 U.S. at 499. It is possible that the Court broadened its test for determining whether
there is an Eighth Amendment violation in these cases, though, as the Court expansively stated that
there is an Eighth Amendment violation when "[a] prison ... deprives prisoners of basic sustenance,
including adequate medical care, [because it] is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and
has no place in civilized society." Id. at 510.
265. See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 7.
266. See supra Part HI.A.
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humane" and can, in the worst cases, amount to torture." In Hope v.
Pelzer, the Court explained that tying the inmate to the hitching post un-
der those circumstances was "obvious[ly] cruel" and "antithetical to hu-
man dignity."268 In both proportionality and the concern for human be-
ings, then, the prison-condition cases again emphasize the importance of
the individual offender. Like the other Punishments Clause cases, these
cases suggest that it is unconstitutional to neglect the importance of the
individual offender in punishing.
V. THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF PURELY UTILITARIAN.
PUNISHMENT
The minimum non-instrumentalization core of constitutional dignity
that the Court seems to have adopted has significant consequences for
when and how offenders may be constitutionally punished. The Court's
focus on the individual offender and command that offenders must be
viewed as ends in themselves rather than as means to achieve other ends
places limitations on the types of punishments that may be constitutional-
ly imposed. Purely utilitarian punishment, it seems, is impermissible. By
"purely utilitarian punishment," I mean the variety of utilitarianism to
which legal scholars ordinarily refer when they reference utilitarianism.2 6 9
It is the type described by Jeremy Bentham-"universalistic hedonistic
act utilitarian[ism]" 270 -which is ordinarily described as creating the
greatest happiness for the greatest number of people.271 For example, say
267. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 103; see supra text accompanying notes 133-35.
268. Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730,745 (2002); see supra text accompanying notes 157-160.
269. See, e.g., Meredith J. Duncan, Sex Crimes and Sexual Miscues: The Need for a Clearer Line
Between Forcible Rape and Nonconsensual Sex, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1087, 1116 (2007) ("Utilitar-
ianism justifies the punishment of criminals only if such punishment serves the overall greater good of
increasing societal happiness."); H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 828, 829-
30 (1979) ("In the perspective of classical maximising utilitarianism separate individuals are of no in-
trinsic importance but only important as the points at which fragments of what is important, i.e. the
total aggregate of pleasure or happiness, are located."); David A. J. Richards, Commercial Sex and the
Rights of the Person: A Moral Argument for the Decriminalization of Prostitution, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
1195, 1227 (1979) (referencing "utilitarian calculations of the greatest happiness of the greatest num-
ber.").
270. See JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCrION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 2 (1907) ("By utility is meant that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce ...
happiness or ... unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered: if that party be the community
in general, then the happiness of the community: if a particular individual, then the happiness of that
individual."); 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 605 (Donald M. Borchert ed., 2d ed. 2006); Jeremy
Bentham, A Fragment on Government, in BENTHAM'S FRAGMENT ON GOVERNMENT 93 (F.C. Monta-
gue ed., 1891) ("[I]t is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right and
wrong.. .. ").
271. See BENTHAM, supra note 270, at 2-4; supra note 269. Bentham noted that "utility" is often
described as "the greatest happiness or greatest felicity principle." BENTHAM, supra note 270, at 2. He
said that this label was for brevity and in substitution for stating that it is a principle providing that "the
greatest happiness of all those whose interests is in question as being the right and proper, and only
right and proper and universally desirable, end of human action: of human action in every situation,
and in particular in that of a functionary or set of functionaries exercising the powers of Government."
Id.
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that a crazed man has taken ten individuals hostage and is threatening to
kill them. He says that he will trade their lives (and freedom) in exchange
for the authorities handing over his ex-wife, whom he will kill instead.
Should the authorities sacrifice one individual woman's life to save the
ten hostages? Pure utilitarianism says yes (assuming all other factors are
equal). It suggests that individuals may be used to achieve greater societal
happiness? Focusing on the happiness of the greatest number of people,
or societal happiness, in this way loses sight of the individual. In this
sense, pure utilitarianism is at odds with the non-instrumentalization
principle of dignity that the Court seems to have adopted as an Eighth
Amendment constitutional limitation on punishment. Thus, if the Court
has adopted this non-instrumentalization principle, then it has rejected
the purely utilitarian approach to punishment. 27 3
Perhaps it should not be surprising that purely utilitarian punish-
ment is unconstitutional. After all, purely utilitarian punishment has been
criticized for years. One of the primary criticisms of utilitarian punish-
ment is that it justifies punishing innocent individuals. As H.J. McCloskey
explained, "[i]t appears to be useful to do lots of things which are unjust
and undesirable .... We may sometimes best deter others by punishing,
by framing, an innocent man who is generally believed to be
guilty .... " 27 4 Why it is unpalatable to punish the innocent is ordinarily
assumed rather than discussed, but perhaps intuitive notions of human
dignity are why most people can agree upon this conclusion? Indeed,
most legal scholars seem to have concluded that ignoring the individual-
272. But see P.J. KELLY, UTILITARIANISM AND DISTRIBUTIVE JusTICE: JEREMY BENTHAM AND
THE CIvIL LAW 81 (1990) (explaining that, under Bentham's theory, "[1]aw provides the basic frame-
work of social interaction by delimiting spheres of personal inviolability within which individuals can
form and pursue their own conceptions of well-being.").
273. Cf Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector: Tortious and Ethi-
cal Aspects, 30 HoUs. L. REv. 1263, 1335 (1993) ("Kant's ethical principle, the categorical imperative,
disregards consequences in determining moral judgments, a concept diametrically opposed to utilitari-
anism."); Richard W. Wright, The Principles of Justice, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1859, 1867-48 (2000)
("Whether understood as 'love of neighbor as oneself,' the golden rule, or Kant's categorical impera-
tive, the supreme principle of morality in natural law theory, in both its conception of human good and
its conception of the equality of persons, stands in direct opposition to the supreme principle of morali-
ty in utilitarianism, which was given its most explicit expression by Jeremy Bentham.").
274. HJ. McCloskey, A Non-Utilitarian Approach to Punishment, 8 INQUIRY 249, 253 (1965); see
also E.F. CARRrrr, ETHICAL AND POLITICAL THINKING 65 (1947) (suggesting "it might be highly expe-
dient [in some circumstances] to hang an innocent man, if a charge against him could be so framed that
he were universally thought guilty."). But see Guyora Binder & Nicholas J. Smith, Framed: Utilitarian-
ism and Punishment of the Innocent, 32 RUTGERs L.J. 115, 118-19 (2001) (arguing that "the charge of
framing the innocent rests on a misunderstanding of utilitarian penology as an application of an 'act-
utilitarian' ethic governing individual behavior" and that utilitarianism actually "began as a normative
theory of law and legal process aiming not just at happiness in general, but also at security in particular,
and that this theory was methodologically committed to publicity, regularity and representativeness of
legal decisionmaking.").
275. Other explanations for why we should be concerned about punishing innocent persons in-
clude basic unfairness and allowing the true offender to go free. See Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M.
Steiker, The Seduction of Innocence: The Attraction and Limitations of the Focus on Innocence in Capi-
tal Punishment Law and Advocacy, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 587, 596 (2005).
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and his particular desert in any case-is unacceptable. 276 At the extreme,
it seems unjust to punish an innocent person just because it would in-
crease society's overall happiness (such that it outweighs the innocent
person's decrease in happiness)." Instead of adopting a purely utilitarian
view of punishment, most courts and legal scholars have adopted a theory
of limiting retributivism, under which the offender's desert sets the
bounds of how much, and how little, an offender should be punished. 278
Within this range of acceptable punishment, utilitarian theories of pun-
ishment-such as deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation -may be
employed to determine the exact punishment that should be imposed. 279
Because such a theory takes into account the offender as an individual, it
is not purely utilitarian punishment even though utilitarian considerations
play a role in determining the appropriate punishment. Accordingly, pun-
ishing under the theory of limiting retributivism does not pose the same
constitutional dignity concerns that purely utilitarian punishment does.
Purely utilitarian punishment is not only disfavored, but it is also uncon-
stitutional under the Court's interpretation of Eighth Amendment digni-
t.280
VI. TAKING EIGHTH AMENDMENT DIGNITY SERIOUSLY
If we take the Eighth Amendment dignity demand seriously and
recognize the constitutional importance of the individual offender, some
of our common criminal justice practices become questionable. Many of
these practices ignore the offender as an individual human being. For ex-
ample, overlooking individual innocence for the sake of utilitarian goals
like finality raises an Eighth Amendment dignity concern. Similarly, stat-
utes authorizing punishments based only on utilitarian goals are prob-
lematic. And practices like imposing mandatory sentences also lose sight
276. See supra text accompanying note 262.
277. Note that legal scholars often seem not to concern themselves with the nuances of differing
types of utilitarianism, or even consequentialism, so this classical understanding of utilitarianism is usu-
ally what legal scholars are referring to when they speak of utilitarianism.
278. See Ryan, supra note 103, at 1062 (noting that "perhaps the permutation of ... retributivism
that has gained the most traction among courts and scholars is 'limiting retributivism,' which uses the
tenets of ordinary retributivism to determine the appropriate endpoints on an acceptable range of pun-
ishment and uses consequentialist theories to determine the particular punishment within that range.");
cf MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), cmt. b(3) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2007) (commenting
that the purpose of punishment provision of the most recent draft of the Model Penal Code: Sentencing
relies on Norval Morris's theory of limiting retributivism); Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58
STAN. L. REV. 67, 76,78 (2005) ("[A]lmost every system has adopted some form of what Norval Morris
called 'limiting retributivism' (also known as modified just deserts).").
279. See NORVAL MORRIS, MADNESS AND THE CRIMiNAL LAW 161 (1982) (explaining that, "[t]o
the limiting retributivist, desert sets the outer limits, upper and lower, of punishment" but that one's
sense of what a criminal deserves "is not finely tuned"); Norval Morris & Marc Miller, Predictions of
Dangerousness, in 6 CRIME AND JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 1, 37 (Michael Tonry & Norval
Morris eds., 1985) ("The upper and lower limits of 'deserved' punishment set the range within which
utilitarian values, including values of mercy and human understanding, may properly fix the punish-
ment to be imposed.").
280. See supra Part IV.
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of the individual, raising Eighth Amendment concerns. While the consti-
tutional requirements of dignity may be more robust than the basic non-
instrumentalization of individual offenders, this is the core of the Eighth
Amendment dignity demand. If dignity is really the backdrop of the
Eighth Amendment, then we need to look more carefully at these crimi-
nal justice practices.
A. A Ban on Punishing the Innocent
Recognizing the dignity limitation on punishment under the Eighth
Amendment sheds new light on freestanding claims of actual innocence.
In recent decades, there has been much debate about whether criminal
convictions should be overturned based only upon evidence of convicted
individuals' factual innocence. For example, in 2008, the federal district
court for the Eastern District of Michigan denied Mr. Jash Lardie's peti-
tion for a writ of habeas corpus, which was based on his claim of actual
innocence.2' Lardie had been sentenced to six to fifteen years' imprison-
ment based on his convictions for three counts of operating a vehicle un-
der the influence of liquor, causing death.2" He had apparently imbibed
alcohol, smoked marijuana, driven several passengers in his vehicle, and
gotten into a car accident that killed three of his passengers.28 In his ha-
beas petition, Lardie claimed that he was innocent and that newly discov-
ered evidence raised doubt about his guilt.' In his petition for writ of ha-
beas corpus, though, Lardie pointed to a 2003 police report and a written
statement from an individual alleging that another occupant of the car
had admitted that he could have been the driver?5' Despite this, the court
denied Lardie's petition because "[c]laims of actual innocence based on
newly discovered evidence have never been held to state a ground for
federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation oc-
281. See Lardie v. Birkett, No. 05-CV-74766-DT, 2008 WL 474072, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 19,
2008).
282. See id. ("Petitioner Jash E. Lardie, has filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his 1996 convictions for three counts of OUIL causing death which were
imposed following a jury trial in the Grand Traverse County Circuit Court.").
283. See id. As the court explained, "the Michigan Supreme Court summarized" the events:
On May 22, 1993, defendant Lardie drank alcohol and smoked marijuana at a party at his
parents' home. Defendant was seventeen years old. He left his home at approximately 1:50
a.m. to give several people from the party a ride to one of their cars. From the physical evi-
dence, defendant apparently drove the car off the paved road and traveled about 130 feet on
the shoulder. The car hit a small tree and then, traveling another sixty or seventy feet, struck
a larger one, killing the three passengers in the back seat, Jason Stutesman, Kendra Tiernan,
and Erinn Tompkins. Lardie had an estimated blood-alcohol level of 0.12 percent or greater
at the time of the accident and tested positive for marijuana use. The medical expert testified
that taking these two substances together creates a "synergistic type impairment," multiplying
the impairment rather than just adding to what each would cause alone.
Id. (quoting People v. Lardie, 551 N.W.2d 656, 658 (Mich. 1996)).
284. See id. at *1, *3.
285. See id. at *3 ("The evidence at issue is a 2003 police report and written statement from Shawn
Priest stating that the passenger of the car, Christopher Timms, told him in 1993 that he (Timms) may
have been the driver of the car.").
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curring in the underlying state criminal proceeding";" instead, "[f]ederal
habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are not imprisoned in viola-
tion of the Constitution -not to correct errors of fact. "2
Like other courts reaching similar conclusions, the Lardie court
based its decision on what is perhaps the Supreme Court's most notable
actual innocence case: Herrera v. Collins.' In 1982, Mr. Herrera was
convicted of capital murder in Texas. 28 9 He appealed his conviction and
lost, and then he filed habeas corpus petitions in both state and federal
court, on which he was also unsuccessful.2" Nearly a decade later, though,
Herrera filed another habeas petition in state court claiming, based on
newly discovered evidence, that he was actually innocent. 291 He lost once
again but then filed a similar petition in federal court, which made its way
up to the U.S. Supreme Court.21 In deciding the case, there was a sharp
divide among the Justices as to whether it is unconstitutional to execute
an innocent person. 2 93 The Court ultimately decided the case on the
ground that, regardless of whether executing an innocent person would
pose a constitutional problem, Herrera had not made a sufficient showing
of innocence. 2" Thus, Herrera lost his case in a 6-3 decision and was exe-
cuted at 4:49 a.m. on April 12, 1993, in Huntsville, TX. 2 95 In his final mo-
ments, Herrera said: "I am innocent, innocent, innocent.. .. Make no
mistake about this. I owe society nothing.... I am an innocent man and
something very wrong is taking place tonight." 2 96 The Herrera case has re-
ceived significant attention, and Herrera's name is just one of many
names at the center of earnest discussions about innocent people being
punished.
286. Id. (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,400 (1993)).
287. Id. (quoting Herrera, 506 U.S. at 400). The court further stated that even "federal courts
which have suggested that habeas relief could conceivably be granted upon newly-discovered evidence
have set an extraordinary showing of a petitioner's innocence before relief could be granted," and "Pe-
titioner has not met this standard." Id. at *3-*4.
288. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
289. See id. at 393.
290. See id. at 393, 395-96.
291. See id. at 396.
292. See id. at 396, 398.
293. Compare id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that it is a "fundamental legal princi-
ple that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution."), id. at 429 (White, J., concur-
ring) ("I assume that a persuasive showing of 'actual innocence' made after trial, even though made
after the expiration of the time provided by law for the presentation of newly discovered evidence,
would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner in this case."), and id. at 430 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) ("Nothing could be more contrary to contemporary standards of decency . . . or more
shocking to the conscience ... than to execute a person who is actually innocent."), with id. at 427-28
(Scalia, J., concurring) ("There is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice (if that
were enough) for finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration of newly discov-
ered evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction.").
294. See id. at 417.
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Considering our general intuitions that are perhaps rooted in digni-
ty,2 9 it may seem obvious that offenders' convictions should be over-
turned when evidence of their actual innocence arises. But there are oth-
er considerations to take into account. Reexamining a conviction after
appellate review has been completed, and certainly after a round of ha-
beas has come to an end, undermines the doctrine of finality. Finality has
been deemed to be important, although its sacrosanct position has been
criticized in recent years.2" Finality is said to further several vital inter-
ests, such as the government's "punitive interests," deterrence, rehabilita-
tion, closure for the victims, and federalism and comity.2" Accounting for
this finality doctrine, the traditional writ of habeas corpus limits the
grounds on which an offender can challenge his conviction once it has be-
come final.No And federal law-through the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA")-further restricts offenders' op-
portunities to collaterally attack their convictions.3o' These statutory limi-
tations, several courts like Lardie have held, trump claims of actual inno-
cence.3 02
Placing these other interests above an offender's innocence, though,
ignores the Eighth Amendment dignity demand. Pursuant to the Court's
non-instrumentalist approach to dignity, an offender cannot be used as a
means to achieve other ends; an offender cannot be punished despite his
innocence to further broader interests of finality or procedure.' 3 Accord-
ingly, if there is indeed a case in which the convicted offender is innocent,
297. See supra text accompanying note 258.
298. See Ryan, supra note 104, at 127-28 ("The finality doctrine, and the interests finality is said to
serve, has been questioned in recent years . . .. Much of this questioning stems from flagging confi-
dence in the certainty of convictions that is fostered by cases like Herrera.").
299. See Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 452-53 (1986) (Powell, J.); Ryan, supra note 104, at
125-27.
300. See FED. JUDICIARY CTR., Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts, HISTORY OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, http://www.fc.gov/history/home.nsf/page/jurisdiction-habeas.html (last visited
June 4, 2016). See generally Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L.
REv. 748 (1987) (summarizing the history of habeas corpus in the United States).
301. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
302. See, e.g., Graves v. Cockrell, 351 F.3d 143, 151 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the petitioner's claim
of actual innocence because the court rejected the notion that "a truly persuasive actual innocence
claim may establish a constitutional violation sufficient to state a claim for habeas relief," and holding
"that claims of actual innocence are not cognizable on federal habeas review."); Royal v. Taylor, 188
F.3d 239, 243 (4th Cir. 1999) ("Because federal habeas relief exists to correct constitutional defects, not
factual errors, 'claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence have never been held to
state a ground for federal habeas relief absent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the
underlying state criminal proceeding."' (internal alterations omitted) (quoting Herrera v. Collins, 506
U.S. 390,400 (1993))); Milone v. Camp, 22 F.3d 693, 700,705-06 (7th Cir. 1994) (sympathizing with the
petitioner because he could be innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, but concluding that
the court could not grant petitioner relief because Supreme Court precedent "strongly suggests that
actual innocence is not itself a ground for granting habeas relief in anything other than a capital case"
and "a contrary rule would gravely undermine legitimate concerns for federalism and finality by arro-
gating to federal courts, under the guise of a constitutional claim to substantive due process, the fact-
finding function that is generally reserved for state processes.").
303. See supra Part IV & V.
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it would violate the Eighth Amendment dignity demand to punish that
individual.2
It is difficult to imagine that the Court would allow a person to be
punished if it were clear that the individual was actually innocent. Indeed,
six of the nine Justices in Herrera concluded that it would be unconstitu-
tional to punish an innocent person." Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and
Souter explained that "[n]othing could be more contrary to contemporary
standards of decency, or more shocking to the conscience, than to execute
a person who is actually innocent."306 Justice White stated that he "as-
sume[d] that a persuasive showing of 'actual innocence' made after trial,
even though made after the expiration of the time provided by law for the
presentation of newly discovered evidence, would render unconstitution-
al the execution of" an individual2? And Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
said that they could not "disagree with the fundamental legal principle
that executing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution."" But
still, in his majority opinion, Justice Rehnquist clearly stated that:
Claims of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence
have never been held to state a ground for federal habeas relief ab-
sent an independent constitutional violation occurring in the under-
lying state criminal proceedin[g] .... This rule is grounded in the
principle that federal habeas courts sit to ensure that individuals are
not imprisoned in violation of the Constitution -not to correct er-
rors of fact.'
Moreover, Justices Scalia and Thomas argued that "[tihere is no basis in
text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice (if that were enough) for
finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration of
newly discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after convic-
tion."3 10 The membership of the Court has changed over the years, and
today's Court may have varying views on these matters from the Herrera
304. There seem to be other constitutional reasons as to why punishing an innocent person should
be considered as unacceptable. Under the Court's proportionality analyses in both capital and non-
capital cases, it would seem that punishing an innocent person would not only be disproportionate, but
it would also be grossly disproportionate.
305. Justices O'Connor, White, and Blackmun expressed this sentiment in their concurrences and
dissents, which were variously joined by Justices Kennedy, Stevens, and Souter. See Herrera, 506 U.S.
at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I cannot disagree with the fundamental legal principle that execut-
ing the innocent is inconsistent with the Constitution."); id. at 429 (White, J., concurring) ("In voting to
affirm, I assume that a persuasive showing of 'actual innocence' made after trial, even though made
after the expiration of the time provided by law for the presentation of newly discovered evidence,
would render unconstitutional the execution of petitioner in this case."); id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting) ("Nothing could be more contrary to contemporary standards of decency, or more shocking to
the conscience, than to execute a person who is actually innocent." (internal citations omitted)).
306. Id. at 430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
307. Id. at 429 (White, J., concurring).
308. Id. at 419 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
309. Id. at 400. Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas joined in the majority opinion,
although they also authored or joined in concurring opinions.
310. See id. at 427-28.
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Court,"" but it is still difficult to imagine the Supreme Court finding it
constitutional to punish someone who is clearly innocent. The Eighth
Amendment dignity limitation, though, may be a useful tool in setting
this outer boundary on permissible punishment.
It seems unlikely that the constitutionality of punishing, and espe-
cially executing, a factually innocent individual will be tested. If the inno-
cence of an individual were undeniable, political pressure would likely
trigger some other form of relief, such as executive clemency.3 1 2 Instead,
in practical terms, this really comes down to a question of how clear proof
of innocence must be in order to override the societal interests of main-
taining a judgment of conviction and sentencing. The Eighth Amendment
requirement of preserving an individual's dignity does not clearly answer
this question. Taking the strong position that we cannot punish individu-
als if there is any risk that they might be innocent seems unworkable. It
would conflict with the Court's In re Winship' decision setting the appli-
cable standard of proof at beyond a reasonable doubt.3 1 4 This other con-
stitutional standard cannot be reconciled with a total commitment to en-
suring that each individual convicted is actually guilty." And this concern
that complete focus on the individual is unworkable is the same concern
that arises when adopting a purely retributive theory of punishment.31 6
The In re Winship standard of requiring only proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that an individual is guilty before punishment may be imposed sug-
gests that we tolerate that some innocent individuals will be punished.3 1 7
This is in conflict with the theory of retributivism that an individual
should be punished only to the extent that he deserves it. Under In re
Winship, then, the focus on the individual is in some sense sacrificed for
the sake of a working criminal justice system. Just as under the theory of
limiting retributivism,3 18 utilitarianism may be used to fill these uncertain-
ty gaps, and utility may often be a useful consideration in determining the
311. In its recent case of McQuiggin v. Perkins, the Court explained that it has "not resolved
whether a prisoner may be entitled to habeas relief based on a freestanding claim of actual innocence."
133 S. Ct. 1924,1931 (2013).
312. Even though grants of clemency "can be politically motivated and capricious," it still seems
that clemency would be likely in the case of an undeniably innocent person. See Meghan J. Ryan &
John Adams, Cultivating Judgment on the Tools of Wrongful Conviction, 68 SMU L. REV. 1073, 1118
(2015).
313. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
314. See id. ("[W]e explicitly hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused against convic-
tion except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with
which he is charged.").
315. And, factually, it may be impossible to determine with 100% certainty that any individual is
actually guilty.
316. See David Dolinko, Three Mistakes of Retributivism, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1623, 1632 (1992)
("[S]ince any actual criminal justice system is inherently fallible, any such system will inevitably inflict
punishment on some people who are actually innocent and thus do not deserve it.").
317. See id.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 277-78.
[Vol. 20162172
TAKING DIGNITY SERIOUSLY
appropriateness of punishment. Pure utilitarianism, though, which disre-
gards individual consideration of the offender, is problematic. 319
While recognizing the importance of Eighth Amendment dignity
does not resolve the evidentiary question, it does provide courts and liti-
gants with another avenue by which to attack the position that freestand-
ing claims of actual innocence should not be considered due to other con-
cerns, such as the interest in finality or the procedural requirements
imposed by statute. Clear-cut cases of actual innocence may not be the
cases in which these actual-innocence battles are fought, but Eighth
Amendment dignity may also push the balance toward the convicted of-
fender even in cases in which innocence is probable but not absolutely
clear.
B. Purely Utilitarian Punishment Statutes
Taking the Eighth Amendment dignity demand seriously also re-
quires thinking more carefully about individual jurisdictions' statutes and
constitutional provisions specifying the proper purposes of punishment.
Throughout our history, punishment theories have waxed and waned in
popularity and acceptance.32 0 Retributivism has deep roots in our society,
but around the middle of the last century, utilitarian purposes of punish-
ment surpassed retributivism as the primary purposes of punishment in
the United States. 321 During this period of time, reformers sought to firm-
ly establish these utilitarian purposes of punishment within our legal cul-
ture by pushing for their codification in state constitutions and penal
codes.31 This followed on the heels of the American Law Institute's pub-
lication of the Model Penal Code ("MPC") (including its circulation of
early drafts of the MPC), which emphasized the paramount importance
of crime prevention in sentencing criminal offenders.3 23 Indeed, Herbert
319. See supra Part V.
320. See Meghan J. Ryan, Science and the New Rehabilitation, 3 VA. J. CRIM. L. 261, 269-85, 289-
90(2015).
321. See Darryl K. Brown, Criminal Law Theory and Criminal Justice Practice, 49 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 73, 85-87 (2012); Michele Cotton, Back with a Vengeance: The Resilience of Retribution as an Ar-
ticulated Purpose of Criminal Punishment, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1313, 1314-17 (2000); Ryan, supra
note 103, at 1053-57; Ryan, supra note 320, at 269-74.
322. See Cotton, supra note 321, at 1313-14.
323. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02, explanatory note (explaining that the provision governing
"the general purposes of ... the sentencing and treatment of offenders ... [should be viewed within]
the general framework of a preventative scheme."); see also id. § 1.02 cmt. 2(a) (stating § 1.02 "affirms
and articulates the dominant preventative purpose of the penal law."); Cotton, supra note 321, at 1320
(asserting the Model Penal Code's "statement of purposes omitted retribution and articulated only
utilitarian purposes: prevention (deterrence and incapacitation) and rehabilitation."); Norval Morris,
Sentencing Under the Model Penal Code: Balancing the Concerns, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 811, 813-15
nn.7&12 (1988). But see Marc Miller, Purposes at Sentencing, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 413, 414 (1992)
("Criminal sentences are the product primarily of necessity-of process and politics-but not
enough the product of principle."); Paul H. Robinson, Reforming the Federal Criminal Code: A Top
Ten List, 1 BuFF. CRIM. L. REv. 225, 253 (1997) (stating that the MPC's "list of purposes includes all
four of the traditional purposes of criminal liability and punishment: to rehabilitate the offender to re-
duce the likelihood of a future offense, to deter the offender and other potential offenders from com-
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Wechsler, the Chief Reporter for the MPC, affirmed that "[d]eterrence
(both general and special), incapacitation, and correction" are the pur-
poses of punishment underlying the MPC.3 2 4 Soon thereafter, several
states adopted utilitarian purpose-of-punishment provisions modeled af-
ter the MPC.3 25 However, many courts and legislatures later infused retri-
bution back into local purpose-of-punishment provisions as the populari-
ty of utilitarian theories of punishment declined. According to Professor
Michele Cotton, they found that nonutilitarian retribution was so im-
portant that they engaged in "judicial activism"; "abandon[ed] ... the
usual rules of statutory construction"; neglected principles of "federal-
ism," "separation of powers," and constitutional supremacy"; and gener-
ally thwarted the "rule of law" to preserve this nonutilitarian purpose of
punishment.3 " Still today, though, there are statutes on the books suggest-
ing that some states' accepted purposes of punishment are entirely utili-
tarian in nature. Florida law, for example, provides that "[t]he general
purposes of ... the [criminal] code are ... [t]o proscribe conduct that
improperly causes or threatens substantial harm to individual or public
interest" and "[t]o ensure the public safety by deterring the commission
of offenses and providing for the opportunity for rehabilitation of those
convicted and for their confinement when required in the interests of
public protection."3 2 7 The law does not explicitly contemplate considering
mitting future offenses, to incapacitate the offender if necessary to prevent a future offense, and to im-
pose the just punishment deserved for the offense.").
324. Herbert Wechsler, Sentencing, Corrections, and the Model Penal Code, 109 U. PA. L. REV.
465, 468 (1962); see also Cotton, supra note 321, at 1320-21 (discussing Herbert Wechsler's and an As-
sociate Reporter's views on the MPG).
325. See Cotton, supra note 321, at 1324-36. It bears noting that several of the statutes that
Michele Cotton cites as eschewing retributivism and being entirely utilitarian in nature include provi-
sions that could arguably be characterized as retributive in nature. For example, Cotton cites the 1963
Minnesota statute as straightforwardly utilitarian. See id. at 1324, 1326-27. The statute provides that
the state's purposes of punishment are "to protect the public safety and welfare by preventing the
commission of crime through the deterring effect of the sentences authorized, the rehabilitation of
those convicted, and their confinement when the public safety and interest requires." MINN. STAT. §
609.01(1) (1963). Cotton quotes this language of the statute, see Cotton, supra note 321, at 1325-26, but
she neglects to mention the remainder of the statutory language, which provides that "protect[ing] the
individual against the misuse of the criminal law by fairly defining the acts and omissions prohibited,
authorizing sentences reasonably related to the conduct and character of the convicted person, and
prescribing fair and reasonable postconviction procedures" are also included within the state's accept-
ed purposes of punishment, MINN. STAT. § 609.01(2) (1963).
326. Cotton, supra note 321, at 1314-15.
327. FLA. STAT. § 775.012 (2015); see also Cotton, supra note 321, at 1331 n.81 (explaining that
"Florida adopted a utilitarian, nonretributive statement of purposes in 1974."). The statute includes
four additional purposes-"[t]o give fair warning to the people of the state in understandable language
of the nature of the conduct proscribed and of the sentences authorized upon conviction," "[tio define
clearly the material elements constituting an offense and the accompanying state of mind or criminal
intent required for that offense," "[t]o differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor
offenses and to establish appropriate disposition for each," and "[t]o safeguard conduct that is without
fault or legitimate state interest from being condemned as criminal." FLA. STAT. § 775.012. The statute,
which was passed in 1974, was undermined by the Florida Sentencing Guidelines Commission's
promulgation of a guideline stating that "[t]he primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the of-
fender." FLA. STAT. § 921.002(1)(b) (noting that "[r]ehabilitation is a desired goal of the crimi-
nal justice system but is subordinate to the goal of punishment."); FLA. STAT. § 921.001(4)(a)(2)
(repealed) ("The primary purpose of sentencing is to punish the offender. Rehabilitation is a de-
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the individual in sentencing, thus making it constitutionally suspect under
the Eighth Amendment dignity demand.32 Iowa law is similarly utilitarian
in nature. It provides that "[t]he court shall determine . .. which [sentenc-
ing options] or which combination of them, in the discretion of the court,
will provide maximum opportunity for the rehabilitation of the defend-
ant, and for the protection of the community from further offenses by the
defendant and others."3 29 And Kentucky law, in much the same fashion,
provides that "[i]t is the sentencing policy of the Commonwealth...
that ... [t]he primary objective of sentencing shall be to maintain public
safety and hold offenders accountable while reducing recidivism and
criminal behavior and improving outcomes for those offenders who are
sentenced.""' This statute perhaps leaves room for, and acknowledges the
importance of, the individual offender, but to the extent that this is ne-
glected, this statute, too, is constitutionally suspect."'
The cycling between retribution- and utility-driven punishment is
important to recognize, as utilitarian goals are once again coming to the
forefront of criminal punishment.33 2 Just as utilitarianism was ushered in
as the progressive and enlightened view of punishment in the 1900s, the
popularity of retributivism is retreating, and renewed emphasis on utili-
tarian purposes, such as deterrence and rehabilitation, are now making a
comeback.333 This could lead to greater statutory focus on the purposes of
punishment rooted in utilitarianism and neglecting the importance of the
individual offender. Accordingly, offenders' dignities are at stake.
One way of accommodating the return to utilitarian purposes of
punishment is to reconceptualize some of these purposes to account for
individual offenders. Again, only purely utilitarian punishment is imper-
sired goal of the criminal justice system but is subordinate to the goal of punishment."); cf. Cotton,
supra note 321, at 1331 n.81 (describing the shift from a "utilitarian, nonretributive statement of
purposes in 1974" to "an explicit retributive statement of purposes" in 1983). Still, this purely utili-
tarian statute remains law in Florida, even if only on its face. The statute has not been repealed or
overruled.
328. See supra Part III. Although the statute does not clearly allow for consideration of the indi-
vidual, some might interpret its goal of rehabilitation as providing for the individual offender. Most
modem understandings of rehabilitation, though, are purely utilitarian. See infra text accompanying
note 326. Rehabilitating the offender is for the benefit of society not the individual offender. To the
extent that the statute does provide for consideration of the offender, it would not suffer from the same
Eighth Amendment dignity difficulty. See infra text accompanying note 326.
329. IOWA CODE § 901.5 (2015).
330. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.007 (West 2016).
331. See supra Part V.
332. See, e.g., Ryan, supra note 320, at 289-304 (discussing the return of rehabilitation).
333. See generally id. (discussing the cycling between retributive and utilitarian purposes in Amer-
ican punishment theory). The recent rise of evidence-based sentencing-a practice focused on deter-
rence-is one example of this renewed focus on utilitarian purposes of punishment. See Sonja B. Starr,
Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of Discrimination, 66 STAN. L. REv. 803,
809 (2014) ("'Evidence-based sentencing' . . . refers to the use of actuarial risk prediction instruments
to guide a judge's sentencing decision. The instruments are designed to assist judges in their pursuit of
several traditional utilitarian sentencing objectives-incapacitation, specific deterrence, and rehabilita-
tion-each of which centers on the reduction of the defendant's future crime risk.").
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missible under the Eighth Amendment dignity demand. 3 This means
that so long as utilitarian purposes of punishment accommodate recogni-
tion of, and consideration for, the individual offender, there would likely
not be an Eighth Amendment dignity violation. Many modem views of
punishment theory indeed accommodate both utilitarian and retributive
purposes. Limiting retributivism, for example, finds room for both ap-
proaches to punishment but employs retributivism to set the endpoints
for the permissible punishment range and then uses utilitarian purposes
to find the appropriate punishment within that range. 3 35 This is the ap-
proach adopted by the draft Model Penal Code: Sentencing.336
One could make similar modifications to classically utilitarian pur-
poses of punishment. For example, the theory of rehabilitation could be
reworked to accommodate the individual offender.3 37 Modem under-
standings of rehabilitation are ordinarily regarded as purely utilitarian in
nature.338 In the capital context, for instance, most scholars consider reha-
bilitation to be entirely irrelevant because, after all, "[h]ow [could] an of-
fender be rehabilitated if he is being put to death?" 3 39 He does not have
the chance to reintegrate back into society.3o This view that an offender
must reintegrate back into society to achieve rehabilitation focuses on the
societal effects of the offender rather than on the offender himself, such
as by looking at his character."' Earlier conceptions of rehabilitation, in
contrast, focused on the offender-on his repentance and reform.34 2 Rein-
tegrating this earlier conception of rehabilitation into modern under-
standings of the punishment purpose could avoid a clash with the Eighth
Amendment dignity requirement.
Recognizing the relevance of Eighth Amendment dignity here sug-
gests that we ought to reject purely utilitarian purposes of punishment.
One way to do this is to reconceptualize classically utilitarian punishment
purposes such as rehabilitation. This could remedy these purposes' clash-
es with the Eighth Amendment dignity demand.
334. See supra Part IV.
335. See MORRIS, supra note 279, at 161 ("To the limiting retributivist, desert sets the outer limits,
upper and lower, of punishment. It is the reflection of society's official view of what the criminal de-
serves . . . ."); see also NORVAL MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 58-80 (1974) (providing an
earlier description of limiting retributivism); supra text accompanying notes 280-81. (summarizing the
tenets of limiting retributivism).
336. See MODEL PENAL CODE: SENTENCING § 1.02(2), cmt. b & Reporter's Note b(3) (Tentative
Draft No. 1, 2007) (explaining that the Model Penal Code: Sentencing "borrows" its approach to pun-
ishment from Norval Morris's theory of "limiting retributivism").
337. Legal scholars have generally lumped together the concepts of rehabilitation, reform, and
repentance. See Ryan, supra note 32, at 1246 n.102.
338. See Ryan, supra note 320, at 327-28.
339. Ryan, supra note 31, at 1243-45.
340. See id. at 1264.
341. See id. at 1264-65.
342. See id. at 1246-48.
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C. Mandatory Punishments
Mandatorily imposed punishments-made popular in the early half
of the twentieth century-are also concerning if we take the Eighth
Amendment dignity demand seriously.343 The Court has already struck
down as unconstitutional mandatorily imposed capital punishment and
mandatorily imposed life-without-parole sentences for juvenile offend-
ers?" In these cases, the Court emphasized how either capital punish-
ment, or juveniles, are different, thus the mandatorily imposed punish-
ment was inappropriate in those circumstances?" Further, the Court has
emphasized the importance of individualization in sentencing." But this
importance of individualization is not localized to cases invoking the
death penalty or juveniles. Focusing on the individual is at the core of
Eighth Amendment dignity, which is the backdrop of the Eighth
Amendment.3 47 This importance of individualism in sentencing raises
questions about thousands of criminal sentences imposed each year.'"
For example, mandatorily imposed life-without-parole sentences for
adults are questionable. If the punishments are automatically imposed,
343. See Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness of De-
terminate Sentencing Reform, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 61, 67-69 (1993). Professor Lowenthal, who has ex-
plained that "[t]he principal rationales of mandatory sentencing laws are utilitarian," has briefly out-
lined the history of mandatory punishments:
The concept of mandatory punishment is not new. Colonial legislatures established fixed penalties
for most criminal offenses and allowed courts little or no flexibility when imposing punishment in
individual cases. By the early years of the nineteenth century, however, mandatory fixed sentences
had become increasingly rare. Most states, reacting to the rigidity of colonial sentencing schemes,
revised their criminal laws to give trial courts greater sentencing discretion. Mandatory punish-
ment resurfaced a century later, when the New York Legislature enacted a statute in 1926 requir-
ing a life sentence if a person convicted of a felony offense had two prior felony convictions. In the
years preceding World War II, most states enacted similar measures aimed at habitual offenders,
typically requiring courts to impose life sentences for a third or fourth felony conviction. Howev-
er, apart from these early recidivist laws and a few provisions enacted in the 1950s, most of the
current mandatory enhancement laws did not appear until the 1970s.
Id. at 67-69 (internal citations omitted).
344. See Milier v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2460 (2012) (striking down mandatorily imposed life-
without-parole sentences for juveniles); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 301 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (striking down mandatorily imposed capital punishment).
345. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2464, 2469, 2470; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-)5; see also,
@MeghanJRyan, TwrlTER (June 26, 2012, 8:33 AM), https://twitter.com/MeghanJRyan/status/
217611454331883520 ("#Miller opinion largely piggybacks on #Graham. Ct seems to be moving from
'death is different' to 'kids are different."').
346. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2460 ("Such a scheme prevents those meting out punishment from
considering a juvenile's 'lessened culpability' and greater 'capacity for change,' and runs afoul of our
cases' requirement of individualized sentencing for defendants facing the most serious penalties." (in-
ternal omitted)); Woodson, 428 U.S. at 303-04.
347. See supra Part III.A.
348. See, e.g., Ed Pilkington, Over 3,000 US Prisoners Serving Life Without Parole for Non-Violent
Crimes, GUARDIAN, Nov. 13, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/13/us-prisoners-
sentences-life-non-violent-crimes (explaining that, in 2013, 3,281 individuals are serving life-without-
parole sentences for non-violent crimes and that an "overwhelming proportion" of these sentences
were mandatorily imposed); see also THE SENTENCING PROiEcr, STATE OF SENTENCING 2013:
DEVELOPMENTS IN POLICY AND PRACTICE 1 (2013) ("[T]here continues to be a great need to address
the nation's high rate of incarceration . . . . Most states continue to authorize life without parole as a
sentencing option, implement a range of mandatory sentencing laws, and enact practices that extend
the length of time persons spend in prison.").
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
the sentencers lack the opportunity to consider the offender's individual
circumstances or the details of his offense in determining the appropriate
sentence. Mandatory minimum sentences are also questionable if we take
the dignity demand seriously. Here, sentencers cannot act on individual
circumstances suggesting that a sentence more lenient than the mandato-
ry minimum is appropriate. By not examining each individual offender's
particular crime and circumstances, courts imposing mandatory sentenc-
es-even though they are statutorily required to do so-courts imposing
mandatory sentences are failing to take the Eighth Amendment dignity
demand seriously.
VII. CONCLUSION
The core of the Eighth Amendment focuses on the dignity of the of-
fender. This translates into recognizing and safeguarding the individual in
punishing. Ensuring consideration of the offender means that purely utili-
tarian punishment is off the table. Purely utilitarian punishment focuses
on societal benefits rather than on the offender, himself. Accordingly, this
style of punishment runs afoul of the non-instrumentalization require-
ment associated with Eighth Amendment dignity. The unconstitutionality
of purely utilitarian punishment does not mean that partially utilitarian
punishments are similarly problematic. In fact, punishments that are tra-
ditionally viewed as utilitarian may be reconceptualized to account for
the individual offender and thus Eighth Amendment dignity. This new
understanding of the Eighth Amendment that individual offenders must
be taken into account in sentencing, though, requires us to look more
carefully at modem punishment practices, like setting aside freestanding
claims of actual innocence in the name of finality and imposing mandato-
ry sentences. Armed with greater appreciation for the core dignity re-
quirement of the Eighth Amendment, judges and legislatures may now in
a position to make more informed decisions about the proper sentencing
procedures and punishments that should, constitutionally, be employed.
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